Per Curiam.
Per curiam. Indiana law allows trial courts to find that a natural parent’s consent to the adoption of a child is irrevocably implied if the parent fails to prosecute a motion to contest the adoption “without undue delay.” Ind. Code § 31-19-10-1.2(g).
However, a parent’s implied consent to the adoption of a child may not be based solely on the parent’s failure to appear at a single hearing, absent further findings to support a failure to prosecute. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Father’s consent was irrevocably implied in this matter and remand for further proceedings.
….
As to Father, the trial court’s decree of adoption cited to only this provision—and the fact that Father failed to appear at the final hearing— in concluding that Father’s consent to Child’s adoption was not required. We therefore must decide whether Father’s failure to appear at the January 4, 2019 final hearing constituted a “fail[ure] to prosecute the motion without undue delay[.]”
First, we note that Father did appear at the first continued final hearing on July 18, 2018, but when Mother withdrew her consent to the adoption, the hearing was continued to October 5. This hearing then was continued two more times at Grandparents’ request.
We also note that, on the morning of January 4, 2019, Grandparents’ counsel and the trial court referred to Father’s failure to appear as a basis to find his implied consent and as a basis for default….
A few moments later, the trial court stated its intention to “make the finding as requested by Grandparents. Today is the date for the hearing. And there is no showing of cause for [Father’s] failure to appear. So this is an undue delay, as found under subsection g of the statute, and the Court will then find that his consent has been irrevocably implied for failure to prosecute his … what amounts to the objection to the adoption.” Id. at 35.
In civil matters, a trial court may enter a default judgment against a party for a failure to appear at a hearing or file responsive pleadings. Ind. Tr. R. 55. And while a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his child is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests,” that parent’s non-participation in adoption or child welfare proceedings may still result in the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011), quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of I.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Services, 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270-71 (Ind. 2010); K.S., supra. Within this framework, the General Assembly has created several means by which a parent’s consent to the adoption of a child may be irrevocably implied, including the parent’s failure to timely prosecute a motion to contest the adoption.
But Father’s failure to attend the final hearing—one that had been rescheduled once at his request and three times at the request of other parties—is insufficient to overcome the important liberty interests at stake by finding him in default. Father’s failure to appear at a single hearing also is insufficient to support a finding of implied consent when he appeared at other hearings, maintained contact with his attorney, and otherwise participated in the proceedings. See L.G. v. S.L. 76 N.E.3d 157, 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), summarily aff’d in part, 88 N.E.3d 1069 (Ind. 2018) (holding that the dismissal of a motion to contest based solely on the parent’s failure to appear at a deposition was unwarranted given the fundamental liberty interests at stake). We agree with Judge Vaidik that affirming the trial court’s judgment impermissibly lowers the bar for finding implied consent in adoption cases. See C.A.H., 132 N.E.3d at 409.
Finally, we note that Grandparents’ verified petition alleged that Father’s consent to Child’s adoption was unnecessary because he had abandoned Child for at least six months preceding the petition’s filing; failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child; and failed to provide for Child’s care and support when able to do so. App. Vol. II, p. 14. This opinion does not resolve these claims, and our reversal of the trial court’s order does not mean that Father necessarily will succeed in rebutting these allegations on remand; it simply provides him the opportunity to try.
Conclusion
A parent’s implied consent to the adoption of a child may not be based solely on the parent’s failure to appear at a single hearing.
There may be a situation, as in K.S., where a finding of implied consent can be supported by a parent’s failure to appear at the final hearing as part of an overall failure to advance a motion to contest an adoption. But this is not the case here. Father appeared at the initial final hearing before it was rescheduled, responded to pleadings, and maintained communication with his attorney throughout the proceedings. Under these circumstances, K.S. is inapposite.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the merits of Father’s motion to contest the adoption.
All Justices concur.