Friedlander, S.J.
This matter stems from a years-long dispute between certain members of the congregation of the Canaan Baptist Church, in Elkhart, Indiana (the “Church”), and its pastor, Reverend McNeal Stewart, III (“Rev. Stewart”), involving allegations that Rev. Stewart usurped the authority of the Church’s board of directors and disregarded the constitution and bylaws of the Church. The parties to the dispute participated in two separate actions that were filed in the Elkhart Superior Court in July 2016 (Cause No. 20D02-1607-CT-149), and in April 2018 (Cause No. 20D02-1804-PL-65). The first action involved a battle for control of the Church’s finances and property as well as an attempt to terminate Rev. Stewart from his position as pastor of the Church. The instant appeal, however, is from the second action, at the conclusion of which the trial court determined that Rev. Stewart was in contempt of court and ordered him to serve a thirty-day sentence in the Elkhart County Jail.
Rev. Stewart appeals, presenting several issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive, that is, whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the second action. Concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, we reverse and remand with instructions.
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The United States Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires civil courts to refrain from interfering in matters of church discipline, faith, practice, and religious law. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871). Thus, civil courts are precluded from resolving disputes involving churches if “resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry . . . into religious law and polity . . . .” Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 2380, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976). The basic law in Indiana is that courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a private organization unless a personal liberty or property right is jeopardized. Lozanoski v. Sarafin, 485 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied. “Thus, the articles of incorporation and by-laws of a not-for-profit corporation are generally considered to be a contract between the corporation and its members and among the members themselves.” Id. at 671.
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Rev. Stewart’s argument is, in essence, a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Canaan II action. He maintains that the trial court “exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction” when it became involved in his suspension from his Church duties and in the retention vote regarding his continued employment, thus rendering the trial court’s orders in the matter void ab initio. Appellant’s Br. p. 28. The plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as “McCray”) contend that the trial court’s orders in Canaan II “were properly granted and are valid because they do not violate the church autonomy doctrine and are within the [t]rial [c]ourt’s jurisdiction.” Appellees’ Br. p. 15. According to McCray, this matter falls within the jurisdiction of the trial court because the Church is incorporated under Indiana’s not-for-profit statutes, and the trial court’s determinations did not require it to delve into matters of doctrine or faith. We disagree.
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Here, we likewise find that the trial court erred in accepting jurisdiction over McCray’s complaint. Canaan II was initiated by McCray because Rev. Stewart allegedly would not abide by the Disciplinary Action that the deacons imposed, specifically, the thirty- and sixty-day suspensions. Thereafter began the filing by the parties of a series of pleadings with the trial court, seeking injunctive relief to prevent one another from engaging in internal Church proceedings that might result in the removal of individuals from Church leadership. However, the substance of McCray’s claim in Canaan II does not allege a church property dispute as that term has been employed in First Amendment cases. To the contrary, the overarching dispute is regarding who is entitled to control over the Church—Rev. Stewart or certain deacons. As the Supreme Court explained in Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188-89, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2012),
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
Regarding subject matter jurisdiction over complaints that allege a failure by a church to follow its prescribed procedures, we find the analysis in a case from a sister jurisdiction to be applicable and persuasive. In Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575 (1902), the petitioner, following a meeting of the congregation, was removed as a member and deacon of the Christian Church of Huntsville based on a disorderly conduct charge. The petitioner petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the church had improperly removed him as a member and deacon because he was not given notice of the meeting and the congregation had not actually voted on the charge of which he was accused. The trial court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed…Accordingly, the Alabama supreme court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter, even where it was alleged that the petitioner’s removal from the church was not in accordance with church procedure.
The instant matter arises from Rev. Stewart’s suspension from his pastoral duties for his alleged failure to act in accordance with the Church’s Bylaws. Regardless of whether the parties, at times, failed to adhere to the Church’s Bylaws, at bottom, this is a dispute over the Church’s leadership. As such, this matter, at its core, is purely ecclesiastical and one which the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate.
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.