Vaidik, C.J.
Case Summary
B.S. (“Alleged Father”), a man who believes he is the father of five-year-old M.A.M. (“Child”), applied for child-support services through the Miami County Prosecutor’s Office (“Prosecutor”). The Prosecutor then filed a petition seeking to establish that Alleged Father is Child’s father. Child’s mother, T.M. (“Mother”), moved to strike the petition, arguing that the Prosecutor is not authorized to bring such an action. The trial court agreed and granted Mother’s motion to strike. The Prosecutor appeals. We reverse.
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Prosecuting attorneys are clearly allowed to file paternity actions. As mentioned above, Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act requires states to provide various child-support services, including assistance in establishing paternity, in exchange for receiving certain federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651- 669b. To qualify Indiana for those funds, our General Assembly established a Child Support Bureau within the Department of Child Services and charged it with “the administration of Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act.” Ind. Code § 31-25-3-1. Under Indiana Code section 31-25-4-13.1, the Child Support Bureau is required to contract with a prosecuting attorney or other person or entity in each judicial circuit “to undertake activities required to be performed under Title IV-D,” including “establishment of paternity” and “establishment, enforcement, and modification of child support orders[.]” Ind. Code § 31-25-4- 13.1(b). In turn, Indiana’s paternity statutes, found at Indiana Code article 31- 14, identify “a prosecuting attorney operating under an agreement or contract with the department described in IC 31-25-4-13.1” as one of the persons authorized to file a paternity action. Ind. Code § 31-14-4-1(7)(B). [Footnote omitted.] The Prosecutor asserts that he is operating under such a contract in this case.
Mother does not dispute that the Prosecutor is operating under such a contract, but she contends that the authority granted by Section 31-14-4-1(7)(B) is strictly limited by Indiana Code section 31-14-4-3…Mother contends that this statute identifies the only circumstances in which prosecutors can file paternity actions and that because neither she nor the Department of Child Services has executed an assignment of support rights, the Prosecutor was not authorized to file the Amended Petition. The trial court agreed with Mother and ruled that in Section 31-14-4-3 “the General Assembly has clearly enumerated the circumstances under which ‘a prosecuting attorney operating under an agreement or contract described in IC 31-25-4-13.1’ may file a paternity action.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Most importantly, Title IV-D (42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b) and Indiana’s corresponding IV-D statutes (Indiana Code chapter 31-25-4) specifically contemplate the State filing paternity actions in circumstances beyond those set forth in Section 31-14-4-3. Section 31-14-4-3 deals with situations in which benefits have been paid out under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, or “TANF,” which was established by Part A of Title IV (42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619). A mother or another person with whom a child resides receives assistance under Part A and executes an assignment of support rights, and a prosecutor proceeds under Part D and Section 31-14-4-3 to establish paternity and then seeks to recoup funds from the father.
However, the grant of assistance under Part A is not a prerequisite to action under Part D….Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A) provides that a State plan for child and spousal support must provide that the State will
provide services relating to the establishment of paternity or the establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support obligations, as appropriate, under the plan with respect to– (i) each child for whom
(I) assistance is provided under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter . . .; (ii) any other child, if an individual applies for such services with respect to the child[.]
(Emphasis added)
Indiana’s IV-D statutes follow suit…..In turn, Indiana Code section 31-25-4-19 provides that “[a]ll services provided” under Section 31-25-4-17 must be available to individuals “other than recipients or applicants for the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” upon application for the services. [Footnote omitted.]
As noted at the outset, this case began when Alleged Father applied for services as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 and 654 and Indiana Code sections 31-25- 4-17 and 31-25-4-19. And pursuant to those statutes, the Prosecutor was required to provide those services, including assistance in establishing paternity. If Mother and the trial court were correct that Section 31-14-4-3 sets forth the only situations in which prosecutors are allowed to file paternity actions, important aspects of these other statutes would be stripped of any meaning. When interpreting statutes, we must strive to avoid an interpretation that renders any parts of the statutes meaningless or superfluous. ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1199 (Ind. 2016).
To be sure, there is tension between the statutes just discussed, which grant prosecutors very broad authority to file paternity actions, and Section 31-14-4-3, which seems to restrict that authority. But we think the legislature has established a tiebreaker. Specifically, in the first section of Indiana’s paternity code, Indiana Code section 31-14-1-1, the General Assembly has explicitly stated that it “favors the public policy of establishing paternity under this article of a child born out of wedlock.” To the extent that the statutes above are at odds, this express policy indicates to us that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of allowing a paternity action to proceed. See Dobeski, 64 N.E.3d at 1259 (“Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent[.]”). And if the legislature believes that the paternity action in this case is not one that should be allowed to proceed, we trust that it will amend the statutes accordingly.
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For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting Mother’s motion to strike the Amended Petition.
Reversed. Riley, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Bradford, J., concurs.
Riley, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision which reverses the trial court and allows the State to pursue paternity proceedings at Alleged Father’s behest, outside the two-year statute of limitations.
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Seemingly arguing for unbridled rights to bring paternity actions, the State contends that “prosecutors are required to provide Title IV-D services, including establishment of paternity, to people who are not receiving public assistance. And reliance on Indiana Code section 31-14-4-3 was not necessary in light of the specific provision in Indiana Code section 31-14-5-3(b)(3) for a prosecuting attorney to file a paternity action, as well as the duties imposed by federal and state law [] relating to operation of the Title IV-D program.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). Thus, based on the State’s argument, any putative father could avoid his two-year statute of limitations by simply requesting the State to file a petition of paternity as the child’s next friend. This effectively makes a mockery of the statute of limitations. I would caution the State that although the office of the prosecuting attorney is provided for in Article 7, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, the office receives its authority to act from the Legislature. Mounts v. State, 496 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. 1986). “Where he Legislature has enumerated the powers incident to any given office and the Constitution is silent as to the duties of that office, the Legislature’s enactment is final, and supersedes any residual authority that office may have had at common law.” Id. Accordingly, there is no inherent authority of the Title IVD prosecutor to file a paternity action on behalf of a child. Rather, the authority and the constraints on a prosecutor’s obligation to act as a child’s next friend in bringing a paternity action emanate from the state statutes—or what the State statutes deem appropriate within the federal parameters—not the operation of the Title IV-D program or federal grants initiatives. Accordingly, the State, through its Title IV-D prosecutor, cannot bring a paternity action as the Child’s next friend at Alleged Father’s request, and I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the paternity petition. [Footnote omitted.]