Bradford, J.
Case Summary
On December 1, 2015, Anonymous Nurse Practitioner (“Anonymous NP”) saw Peter Strickholm at Anonymous Practice Group in Bloomington and prescribed Lisinopril-Hydrochlorothiazide (“Lisinopril-HCTZ”) to control his high blood pressure. On December 8, 2015, Peter returned to Anonymous Practice Group, and a licensed practical nurse (“LPN”) checked his blood pressure and noted it in an electronic report. On December 11, 2015, at the latest, Anonymous NP reviewed the report and approved it without ordering any further testing or any other change in Peter’s course of treatment. On December 15, 2015, Peter was admitted to a hospital with low sodium levels and suffered cardiopulmonary arrest the next day, resulting in permanent cognitive impairment.
On December 4, 2017, Peter and his parents/guardians, Alfred and Leila Strickholm (collectively, “the Strickholms”), filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”). On February 1, 2018, Anonymous NP filed her petition for preliminary determination of law and summary judgment in the trial court. On March 1, 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Anonymous NP, concluding that the designated evidence established that Anonymous NP did not provide any medical care to Peter after December 1, 2015, thus rendering the Strickholms’ complaint late by three days. The Strickholms contend, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in entering summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anonymous NP provided medical care to Peter after December 4, 2015. Because we agree, we reverse and remand for trial.
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The only issue in this appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Strickholms’ proposed complaint was timely….
We choose to first address the Strickholms’ allegation that Anonymous NP provided health care to him after December 4, 2015. The Strickholms contend, inter alia, that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Anonymous NP did not provide health care to Peter on December 8 or 11, 2015, when, at some point, she allegedly (1) saw him personally during his December 8 appointment and/or (2) reviewed and approved the report regarding his blood-pressure test results on December 11, 2015. [Footnote omitted.] Because both of these dates are later than December 4, 2015, a genuine issue of material fact as to either one will get the Strickholms past summary judgment on the issue of timeliness.
We choose to address the claim that there is a genuine issue of material fact that Anonymous NP’s December 11, 2015, act of reviewing and approving the record of Peter’s earlier visit constituted the provision of health care, and we find it to be dispositive. Anonymous NP characterizes her approval as merely “an administrative function to close the open note in Peter Strickholm’s medical record[,]” Appellee’s Br. p. 23, and contends that the only response to Peter’s December 8, 2015, visit was made by the physician in the office that day and/or the LPN as a matter of law. We have little hesitation in concluding otherwise. As mentioned, the MMA concerns health care that was provided or “that should have been provided, by a health care provider, to a patient.” Ind. Code § 34-18-2-18 (emphasis added); see also Ind. Code § 34-18-7-1 (“A claim […] may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect[.]”) (emphases added). Even if we assume that Anonymous NP did not see Peter after December 1, 2015, there is designated evidence that December 11, 2015, was the last opportunity she had to evaluate Peter’s latest test results and order further testing or further treatment. We conclude that the allegation that Anonymous NP negligently failed to act after evaluating Peter’s test results generates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she provided health care to Peter on December 11, 2015.
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…So, as in Havens, it was the fact that the last appointment was the last opportunity the doctor had to properly diagnose the patient was dispositive, not that it involved a face-to-face encounter. Indeed, we recognized as much in Szamocki: “Obviously, we can envision countless scenarios where other facts would come into play, and the last physician–patient encounter will not be dispositive in determining whether an entire course of care resulted in a continuing wrong in the context of a patient’s claim for failure to monitor.” Id. at 427. We conclude that this case represents one of those countless other scenarios. Anonymous NP’s reliance on Havens and Szamocki is unavailing. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
We conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anonymous NP provided health care to Peter on December 11, 2015. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Anonymous NP and remand for trial on the question of timeliness.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.
Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.