Bailey, J.
Case Summary
Innovative Therapy Solutions, d/b/a Innovative Pharmacy Solutions (“ITS”), appeals the trial court order setting aside the default judgment ITS had obtained against Greenhill Manor Management, LLC (“GMM”), Hanover Nursing Management, LLC (“HNM”), and Wintersong Village Management, LLC (“WVM”) (collectively, “Management Defendants”) in ITS’s collection action. There is one issue on appeal which we restate as whether the trial court erred when it granted the Management Defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment.
We reverse and remand.
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TS contends that the trial court erred to the extent it set aside the default judgment on the grounds that the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Footnote omitted.] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) governs a request for relief from a default judgment. Subsection (6) of that Rule provides that the trial court may grant such relief when the judgment is void. Management Defendants contended in the trial court and contend on appeal that the default judgment is void because ITS failed to attach an Affidavit of Debt to its Complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 9.2(A), which states in relevant part: “When any pleading allowed by these rules is founded on an account, an Affidavit of Debt, in a form substantially similar to that which is provided in Appendix A-2 to these rules, shall be attached.” Management Defendants contend that ITS’s failure to attach the Affidavit of Debt to the Complaint rendered the latter deficient, which in turn rendered service of process inadequate. Therefore, citing King v. United Leasing, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), they contend that the inadequate service left the trial court without personal jurisdiction over them, and the default judgment was void and should be vacated. [Footnote omitted.]
However, “it is well established that non-compliance with Rule 9.2(A) is not a per se bar to the action.” Brown v. Guinn, 970 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, Trial Rule 9.2(F)—which Management Defendants only selectively quote—plainly states that a trial court faced with non-compliance with 9.2(A), “in its sound discretion, may order compliance, the reasons for non-compliance to be added to the pleadings, or allow the action to continue without further pleading.” (emphasis added). See also Bank of New York v. Bright, 494 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“By its very terms, Trial Rule 9.2(F) affords the trial court discretion in addressing non-compliance with Trial Rule 9.2(A). The court may, in its sound discretion, either order compliance or permit the action to proceed without amendment of the pleadings.”).
Here, the trial court issued a notice to the parties in which it clearly decided to allow ITS to submit an Affidavit of Debt without amending the Complaint. See App. V. 2 at 5 (“Notice Issued to Parties,” stating an Affidavit of Debt was required and, “as a result, no action is taken on the Plaintiffs’ motion [for default judgment] until the affidavit is received and made a part of the record.”) (emphasis added). The court acted within its discretion. T.R. 9.2(F)
Management Defendants also assert that the default judgment is void because the Affidavit of Debt that was eventually filed does not comply with the business records exception to hearsay as provided in Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(6). However, even if that allegation were true, failure to attach an admissible affidavit does not void the judgment for the same reason the failure to attach the affidavit at all does not void the judgment. The trial court has discretion to allow the case to proceed regardless of the form, or even existence, of the Affidavit of Debt. T.R. 9.2(F). [Footnote omitted.] Here, the trial court did not abuse that discretion, and the default judgment is not void. Therefore, Trial Rule 60(B)(6) does not afford Management Defendants relief from that judgment.
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Conclusion
A default judgment is an “extreme remedy,” and we prefer to decide cases on the merits where possible. Huntington, 39 N.E.3d at 659. However where, as here, there is no explanation at all for an untimely response, “[t]he judicial system simply cannot allow its processes to be stymied by simple inattention.” Id. at 658. The trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment.
We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Najam, J., and May, J., concur.