May, J.
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Julio Serrano’s supplemental motion to suppress. The State raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in granting Serrano’s supplemental motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.
On the night of February 20, 2017, Brownsburg Police Department Officers responded to a dispatch regarding an armed suspect in a residential neighborhood. The dispatch was later updated to a report of an armed robbery in progress. The dispatch described the suspect as being near a silver Chevrolet Envoy. Officer Corey Sears, who had responded to the dispatch, encountered a witness at the scene. Officer Sears asked the witness what car the suspect was driving, and the witness responded that he did not know. Officer Sears’ bodycam had not captured a white Cadillac Escalade, but he radioed that a white Cadillac Escalade left the neighborhood at a high rate of speed. Officer Sears did not relay the speed the vehicle was traveling, the vehicle’s plate number, a description of the driver, the number of occupants, or any identifying information about any of the occupants. Officer Sears told another officer at the scene that he did not know if the Cadillac was involved, but he did not convey these doubts over the radio.
Detective Dirk Fentz and other officers, including Officer Chad Brandon, also responded to the dispatch and heard the information reported by Officer Sears about the white Cadillac. Detective Fentz observed a white Cadillac stopped at a traffic light and pulled his car “nose-to-nose” with the Cadillac. He approached the Cadillac, noticed a female driver and two other people in the backseat of the vehicle, and ordered the occupants to show their hands. Detective Fentz testified:
We tried to get them to unlock and exit the vehicle. As we did, the doors became unlocked, Mr. Serrano began to exit the back of the vehicle, pushed between me and Officer [Jonathan] Flowers and then ran across Odell [Street] pulling a firearm.
Serrano began to turn toward the officers, started to fumble his firearm, regained possession, and then faced the officers. Detective Fentz used his service weapon to shoot Serrano one time. The officers then recovered Serrano’s firearm. Serrano was transported to Eskenazi Hospital, and the court issued an arrest warrant.
The State charged Serrano with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and alleged Serrano was a habitual offender. On October 15, 2018, Serrano filed a motion to suppress arguing the traffic stop was unconstitutional. … After the hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion to suppress …
On January 18, 2019, Serrano filed a supplemental motion to suppress. At a hearing on the supplemental motion, Serrano introduced into evidence bodycam footage from Officer Sears. This footage had not been entered into evidence during the first hearing on Serrano’s motion to suppress. After that hearing, the trial court granted Serrano’s motion to suppress without entering any specific findings. The State filed a motion to correct error. The trial court denied the State’s motion, and the State appeals because the grant of the motion to suppress effectively precluded prosecution. …
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution generally prohibit warrantless seizures subject to a few well-delineated exceptions. M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331-32 (Ind. 2016). …
The State contends the traffic stop meets one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because it was an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion. Further, the State argues, the traffic stop satisfied the Indiana Constitution because the police conduct was entirely reasonable. Serrano argues the officers violated both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution by stopping the vehicle. However, we need not decide whether the traffic stop was constitutional because, regardless, Serrano’s conduct after the stop was sufficiently distinguishable and attenuated from the stop to be purged of whatever taint may have accompanied the seizure of the Cadillac.
Under the United States Constitution, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may still be used against a criminal defendant if it falls within certain recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule. C.P. v. State, 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). … One such exception is the new-crime exception. Id. at 1182 … The new-crime exception is a subset of the attenuation doctrine. Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind. 2018).
The attenuation doctrine provides that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the collection of evidence may be so far removed from an illegal search or seizure that the evidence is untainted. Wright, 108 N.E.3d at 317. Therefore, courts may admit evidence that derives from an illegal search or seizure if the evidence itself or the circumstances in which the evidence was discovered are sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal search or seizure. Id. at 321. Courts assess the following factors to determine whether the taint from an illegal search or seizure has been purged: the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of police misconduct.
… When assessing whether Indiana law allows for a new-crime exception to the exclusionary rule, we observed the exclusion of evidence of a new crime committed after an illegal search or seizure does not advance the deterrence of police misconduct that typically justifies application of the exclusionary rule. C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1182. Therefore, Indiana law recognizes a new-crime exception to the exclusionary rule, which “provides that notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement and a defendant’s response, if the defendant’s response is itself a new and distinct crime, then evidence of the new crime is admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality” of police behavior. Id. at 1182. …
The State argues evidence of Serrano’s conduct after the stop and the gun recovered from Serrano should be admissible because Serrano’s conduct is both attenuated from the stop and evidence of a new crime. … The officers did not expect Serrano to push them, run from them, and draw a gun. Serrano’s decision to do all these things after the stop constitutes evidence of a new crime that is separate and distinguishable from whatever taint accompanies the stop of the Cadillac. Consequently, we hold that the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this situation and Serrano’s motion to suppress should be denied.
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Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.