Crone, J.
Case Summary
Nataomi Riley and her husband, Frank Riley, filed a medical malpractice complaint against St. Mary’s Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. (“the Hospital”), alleging that a Hospital radiologic technologist (“RT”) was negligent in injecting contrast dye into Nataomi’s arm in preparation for a CT scan and that the negligence proximately caused various injuries. The Hospital moved for summary judgment. In response, the Rileys designated an affidavit from another RT who opined that the Hospital’s RT breached the applicable standard of care and that this negligence proximately caused Nataomi’s injuries. The Hospital conceded that the RT’s affidavit established a genuine issue of material fact regarding a breach of the standard of care, but argued that the RT was not qualified to render an expert opinion on proximate causation. The trial court granted the Hospital’s summary judgment motion. On appeal, the Rileys argue that their RT is qualified to render an expert opinion on proximate causation and that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding that issue. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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In this case, it is undisputed that the Hospital (through Osborne, its employee) owed Nataomi a duty, and that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the Hospital breached that duty. The question remains whether Southers’s affidavit is sufficient to rebut the medical review panel’s opinion on the element of causation, i.e., whether Southers is sufficiently qualified to render an expert opinion on whether the Hospital’s breach proximately caused Nataomi’s injuries. “…
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In sum, Southers opined that Osborne should have stopped injecting the contrast dye into Nataomi’s arm as soon as Nataomi complained of pain and notified Dr. Findley about the infiltration, and that Osborne’s failure to do so was a factor in causing the injuries suffered by Nataomi. The Hospital argues,
Because some contrast medium is introduced into the surrounding tissue in the absence of negligence, expert medical evidence must be provided to demonstrate that [Nataomi’s] injuries were either caused entirely by the introduction of additional contrast medium after breaching the standard of care or that her injuries were exacerbated by the introduction of that additional contrast medium. This is a complicated medical question that is beyond the scope of a layperson’s understanding and requires qualified expert medical testimony.
Appellee’s Br. at 12.
We disagree. The Hospital cites no authority for its assertion that some contrast medium may be introduced into the surrounding tissue in the absence of negligence; in any event, as the Rileys observe, “[s]ome contrast going in the tissue is different from a significant amount of contrast going into the tissue.” Reply Br. at 9. Even Osborne herself acknowledged that “the more contrast that infiltrates under the skin, the more damage there can be[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 183.7 It was not Southers’s task to pinpoint the precise amount of contrast medium it would have taken to cause any injury to Nataomi; it was merely his task to state, based on his expertise, whether Osborne’s alleged breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause of the injuries that Nataomi actually suffered. The Rileys point out that Nataomi “faced a visible collection of caustic fluid just under her skin the same size as the fluid introduced by [RT] Osborne, within seconds of the injection.” Appellants’ Br. at 31. The causation issue here was not complex, and therefore we conclude that Southers was qualified to render an expert opinion and thus establish a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the Hospital and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur