Baker, J.
Irma Elisabeth Avila Luis (“Irma”) used to live with her mother in Guatemala. Irma’s mother did not have enough money to feed or provide healthcare for her daughter. When Irma was sixteen, Irma’s mother put her on a bus, alone, to travel to the United States. Eventually, Irma was placed in the care of her brother, Ramiro Velasquez Avila (“Avila”), who lives in Seymour, Indiana. He filed a petition to become her guardian, which the trial court granted, but it refused to make required findings as to her immigration status.
This case has been here before, after Avila appealed the first order. This Court ordered the trial court to make the required findings. Now, the case is here again, after the trial court refused to abide by this Court’s instructions in the first appeal. We now reverse in part and remand with instructions that the trial court enter an order, instanter, bearing the language contained at the end of this opinion.
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As noted above, trial courts in this situation are required to consider and make findings on two statutory elements: (1) is reunification with one or both parents viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; and (2) would it be in the special immigrant’s best interest to be returned to her previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence? See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii).
Viability of Reunification
While the trial court here found that it is possible for reunification between Irma and her mother to occur, it failed to consider whether that reunification is viable. [Footnote omitted.] This is not a meaningless distinction, as these two words have very different meanings. In other words, to refuse to make this finding, a trial court must have evidence showing that there is a reasonable chance that reunification will succeed.
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We can only conclude that the trial court’s own findings support a conclusion that reunification between Irma and her mother is not viable—not likely to succeed. When Irma lived with her mother, she did not have enough to eat, and her mother, being unable to provide for or take care of her daughter, put sixteen-year-old Irma on a bus, alone, to travel illegally to another country. Nothing in the record suggests that circumstances have changed for Irma’s mother. The trial court focused on whether there was evidence that Irma was physically removed from her residence, but this straw man of an analysis is not part of the statutory consideration of viability. Both the evidence in the record and the trial court’s own findings of fact lead to one inescapable conclusion: reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to abandonment and/or neglect.
Next, we must consider whether it would be in Irma’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala or to remain in the United States. Here, again, we turn to the trial court’s findings in the order at issue in this appeal. In addition to the above findings related to Irma’s living conditions in Guatemala, the trial court found that “[s]ince January 2017, the child has been residing with [Avila] at his home in Jackson County, Indiana and has been providing the child her nutritional needs, educational needs and other appropriate needs.” Appealed Order p. 2.
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Therefore, in considering what is in Irma’s best interests, the trial court should have considered financial matters—which is the only thing it focused on—as well as, for example, education, housing, nutrition, and healthcare. While Irma did attend school and have housing in Guatemala, the record reveals that her nutritional needs were not being met and that her mother could not afford to send her to a doctor when needed. In the United States, however, all these needs are being met. At the time of the guardianship hearing, Irma was attending high school, had a comfortable home and a place to sleep, had enough food to eat, and had financial and emotional support from Avila, her brother.
While it is ultimately for the federal government to determine whether Irma may remain in the United States, it was incumbent upon the trial court to make SIJ findings, including a best interests determination. Here, it refused to do so, which was erroneous. We can only conclude, based on the evidence in the record, that it would not be in her best interest to return to Guatemala.
Normally, we would remand to the trial court to make the appropriate findings. But we have already done that once and the trial court refused to comply with our instructions on remand. There is a clock that is ticking for Irma, in that she must provide the federal government with an order containing the SIJ findings by December 28, 2019. Given that the trial court took an inordinate amount of time to issue its order following the first appeal and that it refused to make the required findings a second time, we will exercise our authority pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(C)(10) allowing us to grant any appropriate relief.
Based on the evidence in the record and the trial court’s findings of fact, we order the trial court to enter an order with the following findings:
1. Irma Elisabeth Avila Luis has been abandoned and neglected by both of her parents in that her father abandoned her before birth and died, and her mother allowed her to make a dangerous journey across several countries alone and was unable or unwilling to provide for her basic needs, including food and healthcare;
2. Reuniting Irma Elisabeth Avila Luis with either her mother or her father is not viable;
3. It is not in Irma Elisabeth Avila Luis’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala; and
4. It is in Irma Elisabeth Avila Luis’s best interest to remain in the United States and under the guardianship of her brother, Ramiro Velasquez Avila. The trial court is ordered to include these findings, verbatim, and to enter this order within one business day of the certification of this appeal.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions.
Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.