Tavitas, J.
Galen Byers, on interlocutory appeal, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Byers raises one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in denying Byers’ motion to suppress because the warrant to search his home was allegedly constitutionally stale.
Byers argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Byers focuses his arguments on the officers’ use of the video drone footage to obtain a search warrant of Byers’ home. Byers specifically contends that the search warrant was constitutionally stale based on three specific facts of this case: (1) there was no evidence on the video that Byers himself used the alleged illegal substances; (2) there was only evidence of one-time possession and consumption of the alleged illegal substances; and (3) the search warrant was executed four days after the video depicting the use of the alleged illegal substances was filmed.
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Specifically, “[w]here an affidavit merely recites an isolated crime, as in Ashley [v. State, 241 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1968)], time between the occurrence and the issuance of the warrant will likely be crucial to a determination of probable cause.” Id. In Ashley, our Supreme Court held:
Although there can be no precise rule as to how much time may intervene between the obtaining of the facts and the issuance of the search warrant, in dealing with a substance like [marijuana], which can be easily concealed and moved about, probable cause to believe that it was in a certain building on the third of the month is not probable cause to believe that it will be in the same building eight days later. Therefore, since the affidavit only made a showing of probable cause existing on October 3, 1964, and not on October 11, 1964, when the search warrant was issued the search warrant was defective and it was error to deny appellant’s motions to quash the affidavit for the search warrant and to suppress the evidence thereunder seized.
Ashley, 241 N.E.2d at 269.
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[I]n Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, a panel of our Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, holding:
To reiterate, the police waited eight days to execute the search of Huffines’ home, the same number of days that elapsed in Ashley between the showing of probable cause and issuance of the search warrant. And here, as in Ashley, the warrant was based on a single, isolated drug transaction. There is no evidence of Co repeated or ongoing criminal activity. The affidavit did not detail the amount of drugs that C.I. saw in Huffines’ home. Thus, we cannot know whether it was a large amount or only the amount that C.I. purchased.
Id. at 1099.
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Similarly to Ashley and Huffines, here, the search warrant was based on one occurrence—the drone video evidence of possession of the drugs. The time difference here, however, makes this case distinguishable. Specifically, the four-day time period between the activity and issuance of the warrant was half the time of the periods in Ashley and Huffines. Moreover, while we look at the date of the video footage to determine whether probable cause existed, some lapse can also be accounted for here because Vormohr was in possession of the drone for likely at least one of those days. And, although we acknowledge that the woman in the video handled the alleged substances, the video also shows another individual—a man who Vormohr testified was Byers—handling the drone moments later in the same and subsequent video recordings. Based on the facts and circumstances before us, we cannot say that a four-day period between the activity and the finding of probable cause renders the warrant constitutionally stale.
The trial court did not err in denying Byers’ motion to suppress due to staleness under the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.
Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.