Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Respondent, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), appeals the trial court’s Order granting the Appellee-Petitioner, Thomas Douglass’ (Douglass), petition for judicial review, in which he seeks to set aside his ten-year suspension of his driving privileges in Indiana and his habitual traffic violator (HTV) determination.
We reverse.
ISSUE
BMV presents three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by granting Douglass’ petition for judicial review.
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The trial court granted Douglass’ petition for judicial review after finding that “[a]t the time of BMV’s suspension of [Douglass’] privileges, its records contained a material error in that [Douglass] no longer held an Indiana driver’s license or driving privileges that were granted by Indiana, and in fact was (and is) a California resident and licensee.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11). The trial court further determined that “[t]here is no authority for a party state to suspend the driver’s license or driving privileges of someone whose privileges are currently issued by another state, or in other words, by that person’s new ‘home state.’” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11).
BMV asserts that the trial court erred by reversing its suspension of Douglass’ driving privileges and HTV determination because Indiana law mandates the agency to suspend the driving privileges of a licensee for a period of ten years, in light of qualifying convictions. BMV also argues that the Interstate Driver’s License Compact does not deprive a party state, in this case Indiana, of the power to suspend driving privileges even if the nonresident licensee has a valid driver’s license issued by another state. In response, Douglass contends that BMV lacked authority to suspend his Indiana driving privileges since he was no longer a resident of Indiana, and only his home-state, California, had authority to suspend his driving privileges.
This matter involves the interaction of two statutes, i.e., the Indiana HTV and driving privilege suspension laws, and Interstate Driver’s License Compact.
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As stated, Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4(b) provides that BMV may suspend the driving privileges of “a person who has accumulated at least three (3) judgments within a ten (10) year period” in Indiana. (Emphasis added). This section is clear and unambiguous, and it applies to both nonresident and resident drivers in Indiana. Moreover, Indiana Code section 9-25-3-2 provides, in part, that … These three sections, read together, permit BMV to enforce its laws as to problematic drivers operating vehicles in Indiana regardless of residency.
BMV also argues that it suspended Douglass’ privileges based on his conduct occurring in Indiana and further claims that there is a difference between suspending a person’s driver’s license and driving privileges. “Driving privileges” means “the authority granted to an individual that allows the individual to operate a vehicle of the type and in the manner for which the authority was granted.” I.C. § 9-13-2-48.3. “Driver’s license” means any type of license issued by the state authorizing an individual to operate the type of vehicle for which the license was issued, and in the manner for which the license was issued, on a highway. I.C. § 9-13-2-48. Here, BMV correctly determined that Douglass was an HTV, and it rightfully suspended Douglass’ driving privileges in Indiana and not his driver’s license. Moreover, as we will discuss in the section below, under the Interstate Driver’s License Compact, although Indiana lacked the authority to suspend his California license, nothing under the Compact prevents BMV from enforcing its driving privilege suspension laws against nonresidents.
III. Interstate Driver’s License Compact
Indiana and California are party states to the Interstate Driver’s License Compact. See I.C. § 9-28-1-3, Cal. Veh. Code, § 15000. Article 1 of the compact, which includes a declaration of policy, makes clear that the compact is intended to “promote compliance with the laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles” in each of the party states, and to make the “reciprocal recognition” of the license to drive “more just and equitable” by considering compliance with the rules of the road as a “condition precedent” to the issuance or continuance of the license to drive. See I.C. § 9-28-1-3.
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In the definition section, the compact does not describe a “home state” as the state of residence, but rather, as “the State which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.” I.C. § 9-28-1-3, Article 2. Following his move to California, Douglass surrendered his Indiana driver’s license and was issued a California driver’s license on June 9, 2014. At that point, Indiana was deprived of its home-state licensing status under the Interstate Driver’s License Compact to suspend or revoke Douglass’ driver’s license. However, Indiana was not pursuing a license revocation with Douglass; rather, it was pursuing a suspension of Douglass’ driving privileges in Indiana.
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The language in Article 6 indicates that the compact is not intended to supersede the application of other—possibly more stringent—motor vehicle laws in Indiana. It is illogical to presume that the legislature intended with the entry of the compact, that Indiana would not enforce its traffic laws against nonresidents. Indeed, this court has held that the “statutes governing driving privileges ‘promote highway safety [,]’ which ‘is a compelling state interest.” Brown v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1219, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted). Indiana has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the dangers posed by intoxicated drivers who disobey Indiana traffic laws. BMV echoes this sentiment by arguing that “Douglas accumulated three drunk driving convictions in Indiana, and the BMV properly applied Indiana law to suspend his driving privileges.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. pp. 8-9).
After having examined our HTV and driving privilege suspension laws and the Interstate Driver’s License Compact, we agree with BMV’s assertion that it had the right to pursue a suspension of Douglass’ driving privileges even though he was a no longer a resident of Indiana. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order canceling Douglass’ HTV determination and the reinstatement of Douglass’ driving privileges in Indiana. Our conclusion harmonizes with the legislative mandate of Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4 which authorizes BMV to determine that a person is an HTV and proceed in suspending a person’s driving privileges in light of qualifying judgments. Moreover, nothing under the Interstate Driver’s License Compact requires party states, such as Indiana, from enforcing its laws against a nonresident regardless of whether they have a valid license issued by their home-state.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order overturning Douglass’ HTV determination and the reinstatement of Douglass’ driving privileges in Indiana.
Reversed.
Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur