Vaidik, C.J.
Brandon Battering, who is charged with child molesting and child solicitation based on allegations that he engaged in sexual conduct with his twelve-year-old stepsister, appeals the denial of his motion for discharge under Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(C). Rule 4(C) entitles a criminal defendant to discharge if the State fails to bring the defendant to trial within one year of the filing of charges or the arrest of the defendant, whichever is later. The deadline can be extended for a variety of reasons. Our Supreme Court held in Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied, that when the State pursues an interlocutory appeal and the trial-court proceedings get stayed as a result, the deadline is extended accordingly. The issue in this case is whether the trial-court proceedings were “stayed” when the trial court authorized an interlocutory appeal by the State and vacated the upcoming trial date but did not actually use the word “stay.” We hold that they were, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Battering’s motion for discharge.
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Rule 4(C) provides, in pertinent part, “No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later[.]” Battering was arrested on December 3, 2015, and charged the next day, so this case has been pending for almost four years—more than 1,300 days—much longer than the one year contemplated by the rule. But not all delays count against the one-year period, and this appeal concerns only 146 days: the time that passed between the trial court’s January 20, 2017 order certifying its suppression order for interlocutory appeal and the court’s June 15, 2017 order granting the State’s Motion to Stay pending the appeal. The parties agree that if those days count against the State, the 4(C) period has run and Battering is entitled to discharge. Battering asserts that there was no stay in place during these 146 days, as required by our Supreme Court’s decision in Pelley, and that those days should therefore count against the State.
The State argues that there was a stay in place all along, that its Motion to Stay and the trial court’s order granting it were just formalities, and that the 146 days should not count against it.
We agree with the State that the trial court stayed the trial-court proceedings, for purposes of Pelley, as of January 20. That day, when the State indicated its intent to request certification of the suppression order for interlocutory appeal, it also said that it would “ask to stay the proceedings and to continue the jury trial” that was set to begin in a few days (January 24). The judge stated that he would be “inclined to grant” a motion for certification and that “I would be vacating the trial if I’m granting that.” … By the end of the hearing on January 20, one thing was absolutely clear to everyone involved: no trial would be taking place until the State’s interlocutory appeal was complete. Cf. State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700, 705 (Ind. 2018)… Notably, when the trial court made that clear, Battering did not object on the ground that the State had not requested a stay or on the ground that the court had not imposed a stay. And while the State and the trial court used the word “continue” instead of the word “stay,” the trial was not merely pushed back (i.e., “continued”) to a different date. It was put off for as long as the appeal would take. That is a stay, regardless of the label used. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1639 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “stay” as “1. The postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or the like. 2. An order to suspend all or part of a judicial proceeding or a judgment resulting from that proceeding.”).
…For all the reasons discussed above, and having closely reviewed the entire record, we are persuaded by the State’s characterization of its motion as a mere formality.
The trial court correctly ruled that the delay between January 20 and June 15, 2017, is not chargeable to the State.
Affirmed.
Altice, J., concurs.
Baker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
While I understand the emotional appeal of the result reached by the majority, and I wholeheartedly agree that its analysis is where our system should be, I do not believe that it is where we are, based on our Supreme Court’s precedent, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the record in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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It is apparent that neither Battering, nor the State, nor the trial court believed that the proceedings were stayed upon the trial court’s certification of the suppression order for interlocutory appeal, given all of the litigation that occurred following that date. And as noted above, neither the trial court’s certification of an order for interlocutory appeal nor this Court’s acceptance of jurisdiction over that appeal mean that a stay is automatically granted. It must be requested and ordered. And here, neither the words of the relevant orders nor the behavior of the parties or the trial court show that a stay was put in place until June—long past the Rule 4(C) one-year cutoff.
Because the proceedings were not stayed until months after the interlocutory appeal was filed and accepted, the tolling rule announced in Pelley and followed in Larkin does not apply. It necessarily follows that the Rule 4(C) clock did not stop ticking. Consequently, I believe that the trial court should have granted Battering’s motion for discharge. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.