Goff, Justice.
In separate proceedings, two teenagers were sent to the Indiana Department of Correction after a hearing where they appeared by video rather than in person. Although the main characters differ, everything else about the teenagers’ stories, from the start of the hearing to this point, is nearly identical. The teenagers each appeared by Skype at a hearing to decide whether their juvenile dispositional decrees should be modified to make them wards of the Department of Correction. Although the teenagers did not object to participating via Skype, nothing in the record indicates that they agreed to do so or that the trial court found good cause for their remote participation. At the end of the hearings, both teenagers were made wards of the Department of Correction. They separately appealed, arguing primarily that their remote participation in their hearings did not comply with Indiana Administrative Rule 14. We find that Rule 14 generally governs the use of telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in our trial courts, including in juvenile cases, and Rule 14(B) applies to the types of hearings involved here. But we ultimately conclude that the teenagers have failed to show that their remote participation resulted in fundamental error. Therefore, they cannot gain the relief they seek, and we affirm the trial court. However, we close this opinion with guidance to courts and attorneys so that this procedural story is not repeated.
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Before the Court of Appeals, C.S., Jr. brought a two-pronged attack. First, C.S., Jr. argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting wardship to the DOC. Second, relying on Indiana Administrative Rule 14 and this Court’s interpretation of Rule 14 in the context of criminal sentencing, C.S., Jr. argued that he had a right to be physically present at the modification hearing and the trial court erred when it went forward with the hearing despite his Skype participation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published decision. C.S., Jr. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 433, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In concluding that C.S., Jr.’s Skype participation was acceptable, the panel differentiated criminal defendants from juveniles and found that C.S., Jr. was given all that was required by statute: notice of the modification hearing and an opportunity to be heard. …
Z.T. brought a similar two-pronged attack, contending that the trial court erred in granting wardship to the DOC and in conducting the hearing with Z.T. participating via Skype. However, Z.T. built on C.S., Jr.’s argument and specifically argued that the trial court’s holding of a hearing at which Z.T. was not physically present contravened Administrative Rule 14 and thereby denied him due process. In a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Z.T. v. State, No. 18A-JV-1656, 2018 WL 6332469, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2018). … The panel then went a step further and concluded that Rule 14 did not apply to the juvenile modification hearing in which Z.T. participated. Id.
… We granted C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s petitions to transfer to address the issue of their Skype participation at their modification hearings, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinions. We summarily affirm both Court of Appeals panels below on the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting wardship of C.S., Jr. and Z.T. to the DOC.
… We proceed in four parts. First, we consider the scope and applicability of Rule 14, determining if the rule applies in these situations. Second, we determine if the trial court followed Rule 14 here. Third, we assess whether the alleged error in having C.S., Jr. and Z.T. participate in their hearings remotely resulted in fundamental error entitling them to relief. Fourth, we offer guidance to courts and parties faced with these situations going forward.
Administrative Rule 14 governs the use of telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in both criminal and civil matters in our trial courts. …
Section A of Rule 14 provides specific conferences, hearings, and proceedings where remote participation under the rule is permissible. … Because the disposition-modification hearings held in C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s cases were neither detention hearings nor periodic review hearings, Rule 14(A) does not apply. …
Section B of Rule 14 then acts as a broad, catch-all provision, governing remote participation in “other proceedings.” … Juvenile disposition-modification hearings fall within the broad scope of Rule 14(B) because neither of the exceptions to the rule’s scope apply. … Thus, because juvenile disposition-modification hearings are not listed in Rule 14(A) and are not criminal matters, Rule 14(B) applies and should have been complied with here.
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Having concluded that Rule 14(B) applies here, we consider whether the trial court followed its requirements. The rule allows remote, electronic participation only when (1) all parties consent and that consent is reflected in the Chronological Case Summary or (2) the court finds good cause. … Without an agreement on the issue or a finding of good cause on the record, the trial court erred when it allowed C.S., Jr. and Z.T. to appear and participate in the hearings via Skype. Because the Juveniles did not object to their remote appearance, however, this conclusion does not resolve these appeals.
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Neither the Juveniles’ general arguments nor their specific arguments have shown that the trial court fundamentally erred in having them participate in their hearings remotely. By failing to object at trial and failing to demonstrate fundamental error on appeal, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. have waived the issue and are not entitled to relief. …
Having resolved the question before us, we pause now to offer advice to courts and parties faced with similar situations in the future. …
If a trial court holds a hearing with remote participants based on a finding of good cause pursuant to Rule 14(B), it must base its good-cause determination on the factors listed in the rule and issue a written order complying with the rule’s deadlines. Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(a)–(f), (B)(3). … Neither this opinion nor Rule 14 aims to provide a complete list of the factors relevant to a Rule 14(B)(2) good-cause determination, but these facts likely would have been relevant to a finding of good cause here.
Further, in making a Rule 14(B)(2) good-cause determination in a juvenile case, a trial court will necessarily need to consider the unique aspects of the juvenile justice system. This system “is founded on the notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the parents.” In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004). … Thus, the child’s best interests will generally constitute a relevant factor under Rule 14(B)(2)(f) in a juvenile court’s good-cause determination.
Finally, when a party is confronted with potential noncompliance with an applicable rule, the party should object. … While objections might not have changed the outcome of the hearings or the appeals, they would have allowed the trial court to address C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s concerns right away.
Administrative Rule 14 controls when telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools can be used in both criminal and civil matters in our trial courts. … and here we conclude that Rule 14(B) governs the use of telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in juvenile disposition-modification hearings. However, because C.S., Jr. and Z.T. failed to object to the trial court’s noncompliance with Rule 14(B) and failed to demonstrate fundamental error, they have waived the issue. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s orders.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur. David, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion.
David, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I fully concur with Part I and Part II of the majority opinion. I also join Part IV of the opinion and wish to praise the guidance given to our trial judges by my colleague. I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority opinion, however, and would find that the failure of the trial court to follow Administrative Rule 14(B) resulted in fundamental error. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.