Goff, Justice.
Deciding issues of great importance under time constraints is but one burden borne by our trial courts. … In this case involving charges of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a juror—after being selected to serve on the jury but before being sworn—submitted a note informing the trial court that one of her family members had been killed by a drunk driver. Defense counsel requested an opportunity to explore the juror’s potential bias, but the trial court did not allow further questioning. …
Based on an incident where emergency personnel found her unconscious behind the wheel of her SUV, the State charged Defendant Tracie Easler with two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
After assembling the prospective jurors, the trial court introduced the parties and explained the voir dire process … The State and defense counsel then conducted their voir dire examinations of the potential jurors. After the dust settled, the trial court announced the six-person jury, which included M.M. (“Juror 4”). Up until this time, Juror 4 had spoken only two times, answering direct questions from counsel about signs of intoxication and reasonable doubt. But when she was announced as a member of the jury, Juror 4 interjected, “Are those—they’re not going to ask us any more questions that are relevant?” The court informed her that questioning was over, and the bailiff escorted the six newly selected jurors from the room.
Another set of potential jurors was seated for the court and the parties to examine and select an alternate juror. Before the court announced who had been selected, it asked counsel to approach and disclosed a note that Juror 4 had given to the bailiff. The note read, “a family member was killed by a drunk driver. It was before I was born, but altered my family dynamic irreparably. I can be a jury member, but thought it is relevant to disclose.” Defense counsel asked if Juror 4 could be brought out and questioned over whether she could be a fair and impartial juror. Instead of responding to defense counsel, the court said, “I just thought I’d share that with you, okay. But I don’t think there’s anything else we can do.”
Defense counsel did not otherwise immediately respond to the court’s dismissal of Juror 4’s note. The court then announced the alternate juror, had her join the other people selected as jurors, and dismissed the remaining potential jurors.
Once all the jurors and potential jurors had left the courtroom, the court returned to Juror 4’s note to clarify the record. After the court summarized the note and the disclosure of the note, defense counsel challenged Juror 4 for cause, arguing that Juror 4 had not been forthcoming on her juror questionnaire when “she said that her grandmother was the victim of murder, but . . . did not disclose anything else.” … The court denied the motion to remove the juror. The entire jury was then sworn in as jurors, and it found Easler guilty on both counts.
Easler appealed, claiming the trial court should have granted a hearing to discover Juror 4’s possible bias and, separately, should have removed Juror 4 for cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Easler v. State, 118 N.E.3d 84, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). It rejected Easler’s hearing-request argument because neither “the incompleteness of Juror 4’s questionnaire” nor the note Juror 4 provided to the court “present[ed] specific, substantial evidence establishing Juror 4’s bias” that would entitle Easler to a hearing. Id. at 90 … The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly declined to remove Juror 4 for cause because either party could have asked related questions during voir dire, and Juror 4 shared her information as soon as possible. Id. at 91–92.
We granted Easler’s petition to transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
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Although a trial court exercises its discretion in regulating voir dire, Easler suggests this Court has not addressed how to secure a hearing if, after a jury is selected but before the members are officially sworn in as jurors, new evidence emerges possibly indicating a juror’s bias. This issue qualifies as a pure question of law, requiring “neither reference to extrinsic evidence, the drawing of inferences therefrom, nor the consideration of credibility questions for its resolution.” Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted). This Court reviews pure questions of law de novo. Id.
“The right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system” guaranteed by both the United States and Indiana constitutions. Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 2012) …“The presence of even one biased juror on the jury is a structural error requiring a new trial.” Id. …
… Specifically, this case raises the following question: What is the minimum amount of new information—in terms of quality and quantity—that would require a court to hold a hearing to investigate the alleged bias or misconduct? …
Our law regarding requests for hearings to question jurors on possible bias or misconduct has been developed primarily through three cases: Barnes v. State, 263 Ind. 320, 330 N.E.2d 743 (1975); Stevens v. State (Stevens I), 265 Ind. 396, 354 N.E.2d 727 (1976), aff’d on reh’g, 265 Ind. 396, 357 N.E.2d 245 (Stevens II); and Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. 1988). …
In Barnes, we laid down the general rule that, when a party presents new information unavailable during voir dire showing possible juror bias or misconduct, the party should be able to question that juror on his or her potential bias and then challenge that juror, if warranted. 330 N.E.2d at 747. …
Stevens I & II built upon Barnes and provided what a hearing into possible juror bias or misconduct should look like when a party presents its new information of bias or misconduct during trial. In these situations, the trial court should conduct a hearing on the matter, outside the presence of the rest of the jurors, to see (1) if the juror was biased or not disinterested and (2) if the hearing itself caused the juror to be biased. Stevens I, 354 N.E.2d at 732. See also Stevens II, 357 N.E.2d at 246 …
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… We agree with Easler that Lopez does not apply here, and we conclude that the burden to show a possibility of juror bias or misconduct and thus receive a hearing under Barnes and Stevens I & II is lower before the jury is sworn in than it is after trial.
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Instead, when a party requests a hearing on possible juror bias or misconduct after the jury has been selected but before it is sworn in, a trial court should hold such a hearing if the party provides some relevant basis, arising outside the normal course of voir dire, that indicates a juror is possibly biased or possibly committed misconduct. Such a hearing should comply with the requirements laid out in Barnes and Stevens I & II.
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Turning to the facts of this case, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct a hearing regarding Juror 4’s possible bias after Juror 4 had been selected to serve on the jury but before the jurors had been sworn in. …
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… Here, Juror 4 submitted a note to the court that provided such a relevant basis indicating that she was possibly biased, and Easler requested a hearing. However, the trial court did not hold a hearing. That failure to hold a hearing constitutes an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Slaughter concur.