Tavitas, J.
Aaron Moran Brown appeals from the post-conviction court’s (“PC court”) entry of summary disposition in favor of the State on Brown’s successive petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). …
….
This matter arises from Brown’s challenge to his convictions and sentences in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), which declared that mandatory sentencing schemes that require the imposition of life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. …
The facts as stated in Brown’s direct appeal follow:
On February 7, 1994, Brown was charged by information with the murders of Elizabeth Grueb, his biological mother, and Jeffrey Grueb, his step-father. … The evidence reveals that in the early morning hours of February 6, 1994, Brown, then 16-years old, lay in wait for his parents to return home from a party, and upon their arrival, murdered them with a shotgun. Shortly thereafter, Brown turned himself in to the authorities.
Brown v. State, 659 N.E.2d 671, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.
At Brown’s sentencing hearing on December 16, 1994, the trial court … [concluded] that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, [and] … imposed consecutive fifty-year sentences on each of Brown’s murder convictions, for an aggregate sentence of one hundred years.
On direct appeal, Brown argued that: (1) his sentence was manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of his offenses and his character; (2) he was denied his right against self-incrimination; (3) the trial court improperly articulated aggravating circumstances and overlooked, or assigned inadequate weight, to significant mitigating circumstances; and (4) the trial court “failed to contemplate Brown’s general character when structuring his sentence[.]” We affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied transfer. Brown, 659 N.E.2d at 674.
In May 2000, Brown filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief wherein he argued that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution because “no consideration was made in Brown’s sentencing” to “[a] juvenile’s specific characteristics[,]” and because his sentence is “the functional equivalent of a [sentence of] life without parole.” After a hearing on March 20, 2003, the PC court denied Brown’s petition for PCR.
On November 3, 2017, Brown sought, and we subsequently granted, leave to file a successive petition for PCR pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1, Section 12. Brown filed his successive petition for PCR on November 3, 2017, and argued that he is entitled to relief under Miller. On March 26, 2018, the State moved for summary disposition. On July 31, 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion for summary disposition. On September 12, 2018, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the State and against Brown. Brown now appeals from the entry of summary disposition in the State’s favor.
Brown argues that “the trial court did not properly consider his youth at his original sentencing[,]” and that, pursuant to Miller, “he [i]s entitled to a new sentencing hearing.” The State counters that “[Brown] does not fall within” the category of offenders contemplated by the Supreme Court in Miller because Brown “received a Miller-compliant sentencing hearing” and is eligible for parole at the age of sixty-two.
….
A PC court is permitted to summarily deny a petition for PCR only if the pleadings conclusively show the petitioner is entitled to no relief as a matter of law. Gann v. State, 550 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The necessity of an evidentiary hearing is avoided when the pleadings show only issues of law. Id. The need for a hearing is not avoided, however, when a determination of the issues hinges, in whole or in part, upon facts not resolved. Id. This is true even though the petitioner has only a remote chance of establishing his claim. Id. at 804-805.
… In Miller, the United States Supreme Court (“U.S. Supreme Court”) held that mandatory sentencing schemes that require lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. … The Seventh Circuit has since held that Miller applies, not only to a life sentence, but also to sentences that—although set out as a term of years—are essentially a life sentence. McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016).
….
In its order on the State’s motion for summary judgment, the PC court found:
. . . Here, Brown did not receive a mandatory life sentence, nor did he receive a sentence which precluded parole. . . . [E]ven if Brown is correct in his claim that his sentence was a de facto life sentence, he would also have to demonstrate that his de facto life sentence was without parole in order to implicate Miller.
….
* * * * *
Due to eligibility for parole, and Indiana’s good time credit statutes, Brown can potentially be released from prison when he is in his early 60’s. He did not receive a life sentence without parole. He did not receive a de facto life sentence without parole. He did not receive a de facto life sentence where the opportunity for parole or release is merely illusory. In short, Brown did not receive a sentence that implicates the narrow holding of Miller, and as a matter of law he is not entitled to the relief requested in his petition for post-conviction relief.
….
… Brown is not a candidate for Miller review. The law is well settled that “[a] State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Brown did not receive a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole; rather, Brown is eligible for parole with an earliest possible release date of age sixty-two. The fact that the widely-accepted remedy for a Miller violation is already available to Brown undercuts Brown’s claim that a Miller violation has occurred here.
To the extent that Brown seeks revision of his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), Brown has already unsuccessfully argued, on direct appeal, that his sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. … The PC court did not err in granting the State’s motion for summary disposition because Brown is entitled to no relief as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.