Altice, J.
Harold Wallick brought a medical malpractice action against his anesthesiologist, Eric B. Inman, M.D., and a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Inman. On appeal, Wallick challenges the jury selection process, arguing that the trial court should not have denied six of his for-cause challenges to prospective jurors. He raises two issues that we consolidate and restate as: Was the trial court’s decision to deny one or more of the for-cause challenges illogical and arbitrary?
We affirm.
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Wallick made twelve for-cause challenges, of which the trial court granted four and denied eight. Six of those eight denials are at issue in this appeal….
The trial court has broad discretionary power in regulating the form and substance of voir dire examination….
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We afford substantial deference to trial judges regarding the decision to grant or deny a challenge for cause, as the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe and assess the demeanor of prospective jurors as they answer the questions posed by counsel…
Here, Wallick asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his for-cause challenges to the following six individuals: Alcorn, Gregory, Walters, Ridner, Hunter, and Wright. [Footnote omitted.] He explains that five of those six “would require Wallick to prove his case by more evidence than the law required[,]” and two of the five “indicated they were leaning in favor of Inman before hearing any evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. The remaining for-cause challenge, as to Juror Gregory, was based on Gregory’s voir dire responses – stating that he was not fond of attorneys or doctors, hates court, and did not think he could listen to all the evidence – which Wallick claims reflects a “stated inability to discharge his duties as a civil juror.” Id. Wallick claims that the trial court’s denial of his requests to strike those six prospective jurors for cause was illogical and arbitrary and denied him a fair trial.
We first address the five potential jurors who Wallick claims took the position that they would require him to prove his case by more than the law requires, that is, more than the greater weight of the evidence. As an initial matter, we observe that the questions that Wallick’s counsel posed regarding burden of proof were asked in terms of what the person would require/prefer/be comfortable with/want to see in order to find for plaintiff, sometimes using quantified percentages such as whether the person would be satisfied with a 51- to-49 scenario. Because the individuals gave answers indicating that, to find in Wallick’s favor, they would prefer or want to see a higher amount of proof, some saying something akin to beyond a reasonable doubt, Wallick’s counsel asked the court to strike the five for cause. The trial court reminded Wallick’s counsel that the individuals had not yet been instructed on the burden of proof or what constitutes a “greater weight of the evidence” and that what counsel was doing “by interjecting percentages and yard lines” during jury selection was not permissible. Id. at 119-20. The trial court thereafter individually asked each of those five (as well as others) whether he or she could set aside personal feelings or beliefs and follow the instructions and law that the court would give, including with regard to burden of proof. Each of the five jurors at issue here responded in the affirmative.
Wallick recognizes on appeal that a trial court has broad discretion to rehabilitate jurors and deny for-cause challenges, but asserts that the trial court’s attempted “rehabilitation” of the jurors in this case was ineffective and only resulted in the individuals giving meaningless, empty promises. Appellant’s Brief at 5. Specifically, Wallick claims that the trial court’s inquiry – asking the person if he or she could set aside personal biases, beliefs, and prejudices and follow instructions as given – simply posed a “magic question” that, if answered with a yes, “made the . . . veniremen’s biases and prejudices disappear into thin air like they never even existed” and rendered an “otherwise incompetent” prospective juror able to serve. Id. at 5, 7. He claims that “[t]he court’s decisions to deny Wallick’s cause challenges . . . based solely on the biased jurors’ affirmative responses to the court’s ‘magic question’ were arbitrary and illogical” because “the magic question” fails to remove individuals who cannot perform the task of impartial deliberations and, instead, merely keeps people on the jury who have admitted they are partial and biased. Id.
In support, Wallick refers us to various out-of-state cases which either did not allow juror rehabilitation “through these types of ‘magical’ questions” or took a critical view of it. Id. at 22. Wallick urges that “Indiana should establish a rule that (1) bars trial courts from engaging in juror rehabilitation by using the “magic questions” and (2) requires trial courts’ rehabilitation to focus on eliciting reliable testimony for determining the competence of a juror.” Id. at 23-24. Assuming without deciding that other jurisdictions do not allow, or take a critical view of, such manner of rehabilitation, as Wallick claims, we find that Indiana does not preclude it, and we decline his invitation to impose such a limitation on a trial court’s substantial deference in jury selection matters.
Here, the trial court individually asked each of the five jurors at issue if he or she could set aside personal beliefs or opinions and follow the court’s instructions that would be given, including with regard to the burden of proof. Each answered affirmatively. The trial court observed these jurors, and “we will not second guess its determination that they were sincere” in indicating they would follow the court’s instructions. See Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 240 (affirming trial court’s denial of for-cause challenges to two jurors, one with regard to his answers concerning appropriate penalty for murder and another regarding her sympathy for elderly or young victims, noting “trial court observed these jurors’ assurances of impartiality”). Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court did not act illogically or arbitrarily when it denied Wallick’s for-cause challenges to the five individuals who initially indicated they would want or prefer to see a higher burden of proof than the required “greater weight of the evidence” standard applicable in medical malpractice cases. See e.g., Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 262 (Ind. 2003) (holding no error in denying for-cause challenge to prospective juror who initially stated she would prefer to hear defendant testify, might have difficulty considering mitigation, and might be biased against someone who committed murder, but also stated that, though she might not like the law, she would follow the law as instructed), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1072 (1999).
The sixth and final for-cause challenge that Wallick appeals is that of Juror Gregory, who testified that he hated court and was not fond of doctors and lawyers. We appreciate the grain of truth in the lighthearted comment that Wallick’s counsel made to Gregory: “You dislike both sides equally? You’re the perfect juror.” Transcript at 122. Because Juror Gregory also stated that he would find it hard to pay attention to all the evidence, counsel for Wallick renewed his motion to strike Gregory for cause. The trial court asked Juror Gregory if he suffered from any physical or mental disability that would prevent him from rendering satisfactory jury service, and he replied that he did not. The trial court was within its discretion to deny Wallick’s for-cause challenge to Gregory.
It cannot be disputed that the trial court in this case gave considerable leeway to Wallick’s counsel, allowing over ninety minutes of questioning and then posing its own follow-up inquiries to Wallick’s twelve for-cause challenges (nine of the fourteen in the initial panel and three of the four replacements). Notably, the court struck four potential jurors whose answers reflected that he or she could not follow the instructions as given. The trial court devoted a generous amount of time to jury selection in order to make sure each person, including those challenged for cause, was competent to sit on the jury. We find no abuse of the court’s substantial discretion and conclude that the trial court did not act illogically or arbitrarily when it denied the six for-cause challenges at issue.
Judgment affirmed.
Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur