Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Respondent, Travis Edwards (Edwards), appeals the trial court’s partial denial of his motion for relief from judgment.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Edwards presents us with three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it partially denied his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment
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On November 12, 2014, Valerie filed a contempt motion seeking an order directing Edwards to pay her the pension benefit arrears that had accumulated and to continue to pay her 50% of the pension benefit, as provided in the dissolution decree. On September 29, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Valerie’s contempt motion. Edwards’ counsel argued that Edwards had been required to waive his military pension benefit as a result of his election to receive CRSC and that CRSC was non-divisible income pursuant to federal law. Edwards’ counsel also directed the trial court to Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), which he contended stood for the proposition that the trial court could not order Edwards to indemnify Valerie for her loss of the 50% pension benefit amount. On December 18, 2015, the trial court found Edwards in contempt and ordered him to pay Valerie the amount she lost as a result of his election to receive CRSC. The trial court relied on this court’s decision in Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), which it cited as holding that “[a] military spouse may not, by a post-decree waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits of CRSC, unilaterally and voluntarily reduce the benefits awarded the former spouse in a dissolution decree.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). The trial court also ordered Edwards to pay $47,263.751 in accumulated arrears.
Edwards did not appeal the trial court’s December 18, 2015 Order (the 2015 Order). On May 3, 2018, Edwards filed his Verified Motion to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6) in which he argued that in Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1400, 197 E.Ed.2d 781 (2017), the United States Supreme Court had held that state courts were not permitted to order a veteran to indemnify a divorced spouse for the loss of the spouse’s portion of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by the veteran’s waiver of retirement pay to receive service-related disability benefits. Pursuant to Howell, Edwards contended that the trial court’s 2015 Order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On December 5, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Edwards’ motion, and, on January 23, 2019, the trial court issued an order partially denying Edwards relief. The trial court found that Edwards had not appealed the 2015 Order; the 2015 Order was, thus, binding on the parties; and the Howell decision, while overruling Bandini, did not render the 2015 Order void because it did not indicate that its application was to be retroactive. Nevertheless, in light of Howell and treating Edwards’ motion as one made pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(7), the trial court held that it was no longer equitable for the 2015 Order to have prospective effect. The trial court denied Edwards’ request to set aside the previously-entered $44,338.75 judgment but ordered that the 2015 Order was set aside and vacated effective May 3, 2018, the date of Edwards’ motion to set aside.
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Edwards argues that the 2015 Order was void ab initio because, in entering what he contends was an order in contravention of federal law and binding precedent, the trial court acted outside of its subject matter jurisdiction….
Here, the Hamilton County Superior Court No. 1 had original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases. Ind. Code § 33-29-1-1.5(1). … Whether the trial court applied the correct law in this case, be it federal or state law, is a question of legal error, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction….
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Here, the unappealed 2015 Order was res judicata as to the parties and precluded further litigation on the same issue of whether Valerie was entitled to the value of 50% of Edwards’ pension benefit, regardless of whether the case relied upon by the trial court, Bandini, was subsequently overruled by Howell. See id. Edwards’ only argument that res judicata did not apply to the 2015 Order is that it was not rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. That argument fails for the reasons already decided. Because lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the 2015 Order was the basis for all of Edwards’ appellate claims, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it partially denied Edwards’ motion to vacate judgment. See P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740. For the same reason, we conclude that Edwards has not demonstrated reversible error, even in light of the relaxed standard of review applied to this appeal. See WindGate Props., 93 N.E.3d at 813.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the challenged order and, therefore, that Edwards has failed to demonstrate even prima facie error as a result of the trial court’s partial denial of his motion for relief from judgment.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur