Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Quintin D.E. Davis (Davis), appeals his conviction for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Davis presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Davis’ request for appointment of counsel made during the bench trial and more than one year after affirming his request for self-representation
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It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant may abandon his pro se defense after trial has begun and reassert his right to counsel. Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196, 198-99 (Ind. 1986). We will reverse only if we conclude that the trial court abused that discretion. Id. In Koehler, our supreme court identified five factors to be considered by a trial court in order to exercise meaningful discretion in ruling on a defendant’s request to change from self-representation to counsel-representation. Id. Specifically, the trial court should consider: (1) the defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set forth in defendant’s request, (3) the length and stay of the trial proceedings, (4) any disruption or delay in the trial proceedings which might be expected to ensue if the request is granted, and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney. Id. at 199.
Initially, and reflecting on Koehler’s first factor, we note that Davis was fully advised of the dangers and disadvantages of waiving his right to counsel, a full year prior to the commencement of the bench trial. The trial court explained the charges to him and the consequences of proceeding pro se. Although Davis acknowledged that he understood the charges and the trial court’s cautionary advice, he indicated that he wanted to waive his right to counsel. During this intermediate time leading to trial, Davis did not waiver in his decision to proceed pro se. Davis was presented with an option of trial dates and the bench trial was set for the date and time he selected. Davis filed motions and obtained court orders in his favor. Even when the bench trial was convened and the State started its presentation of the evidence did Davis remain silent and proceeded pro se. At the commencement of the bench trial, Davis competently—albeit unsuccessfully—addressed the State’s addition of a foundational witness. Only during the State’s examination of its first witness did Davis change his mind. After requesting a recess, Davis returned and asked for counsel to be appointed.
Davis’ reason for his request to retract his waiver of counsel was his unpreparedness and anxiety. The State objected, referencing the ample opportunity to get prepared as the date of the bench trial had been set four months earlier and the inconvenience to the victim who had flown in from out of state if the case were to be continued. Granting Davis’ request would most likely have resulted in a substantial continuance in order for counsel to get familiar with the facts of the case and would have required additional sacrifice from the victim who would have to make an additional trip to Indiana. Although Davis relies on the trial court’s statement that he could request an attorney “at any time” to support his contention that he should have been assigned an attorney midway through the bench trial, the trial court tempered that broad statement with the qualifier that Davis had to send the court “a letter or a motion.” (Tr. p. 17). Accordingly, unlike Davis’ claim, the trial court’s option to assign counsel did not span the entire trial after a full year of pre-trial proceedings; but rather appears to be limited to the legal proceedings prior to the commencement of trial. Despite the trial court’s denial of his request for counsel, Davis effectively defended against the charges pro se. Not only did he manage to impeach the victim during cross-examination, but he also was found not guilty on two of the three charges the State brought against him.
Mindful of the Koehler factors, and given the tardiness of Davis’ request and the trial court’s previous warnings about self-representation, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’ midtrial request for appointment of counsel. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis’ request for an attorney made during the bench trial and more than one year after affirming his request for self-representation.
Affirmed. [
Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur