Kirsch, J.
A.C.S. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decree of adoption, which granted the petition to adopt minor child, C.A.H. (“the Child”), that was filed by R.S.E. and R.K.E. (together, “Grandparents”). Father raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in finding that Father’s consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-10-1.2(g) because Father failed to appear for the final hearing.
We affirm.
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Father contends that the trial court erred by finding that his consent to the adoption of Child was irrevocably implied because he failed to appear at the final hearing on January 4…
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We find the present case to be very similar to K.S., which provides guidance in our decision. In K.S., the birth mother filed a motion to contest the adoption but then failed to maintain contact with her attorney and did not stay apprised of the adoption proceedings, missing two hearings. Here, Father also filed a motion to contest the adoption and then proceeded to repeatedly neglect to participate in the adoption proceedings. Father appeared late to a hearing in July 2017, and after he was appointed counsel, the trial court specifically informed Father that it was Father’s obligation to stay in contact with his counsel and provide her with any necessary information. Tr. at 14. Although Father was admonished to stay in contact with his counsel, he failed to appear for a deposition on September 25, 2017. After Grandparents filed a motion to dismiss Father’s motion to contest the adoption for failure to prosecute, Father filed a response asserting that he did not appear for the deposition because he was incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail. Id. at 36.
Father did attend other hearings in August 2017 and July 2018, but was incarcerated several times during the proceedings, which necessitated at least one continuance, further delaying the proceedings. The final hearing in the adoption case was scheduled for 9 a.m. on Friday, January 4, 2019, and Father was notified of the hearing and, according to his counsel, was aware of the time and date of the hearing when she spoke with him the previous day. Tr. at 33. Father failed to appear at the hearing. Father’s counsel requested a continuance, to which Grandparents objected because Father was aware of the hearing, which had been set for several months and the matter had been pending since May 2017. Id. at 34. Grandparents also noted that it was 10:17 a.m., and the hearing had been set to begin at 9:00 a.m. Id. Father’s counsel had not heard from Father, was not able to present any reason why Father had failed to appear at the hearing, and was not aware of his whereabouts.
Father’s neglect of the proceedings in the present case is similar to the birth mother in K.S., where the trial court found that the birth mother’s consent was not necessary and was irrevocably implied due to her failure to appear at the final hearing. Here, Father failed to appear at the final hearing without any explanation or contact with his counsel when he was aware of the time and date. At the time that he failed to appear, Father’s counsel did not know his whereabouts or a way of contacting him, although the trial court had previously informed Father that he must stay in contact with his counsel and provide her with any information necessary. Tr. at 14. Father alleges that although he was not present during the hearing, he still appeared at the courthouse during the scheduled hearing time on the date of the hearing. However, he does not elaborate as to what actual time he appeared, and his assertion is not supported by any evidence. During the hearing, Grandparents, in objecting to a continuance, noted that it was already 10:17 a.m., which was an hour and seventeen minutes after the scheduled start time of the hearing. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Father’s consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied due to his failure to appear and his failure to prosecute the motion without unreasonable delay.
Affirmed.
Altice, J., concurs. Vaidik, C.J., dissents with separate opinion.
Vaidik, Chief Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Father failed to prosecute his motion to contest the adoption without undue delay and therefore impliedly consented to the adoption under Indiana Code section 31-19-10-1.2(g).
In affirming the trial court, the majority sets a dangerous precedent. Under the majority’s holding, the bar for finding implied consent in adoption cases is set too low. I would therefore remand this case to the trial court to give Father an opportunity to contest Grandparents’ allegations that he failed to communicate with and support Child.