Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
River Ridge Development Authority (“River Ridge”) appeals the trial court’s order granting attorney fees to Outfront Media, LLC (“Outfront”), David Watkins, No Moore, Inc. (“No Moore”), the Schlosser Family Limited Partnership (“the Schlosser Family”), the Town of Utica, and the Utica Board of Zoning Appeals (“Utica BZA”) (collectively, “Appellees”). We reverse.
Issue
River Ridge raises numerous issues, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Appellees is clearly erroneous.
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A. Recovery under Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1
The trial court first awarded attorney fees pursuant to a statutory exception to the American Rule. Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b)…
“This court has repeatedly stated that ‘prevailing party’ in the context of attorney fees denotes a party who successfully prosecutes his claim or asserts his defense.”…
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Without mentioning or addressing Reuille, Appellees make a convoluted argument that they were prevailing parties, 5 and we find that their argument is not cogent. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Given our Supreme Court’s holding in Reuille, we conclude that none of the Appellees were prevailing parties because the complaint was dismissed with prejudice on the motion of River Ridge…The trial court’s finding on this issue is clearly erroneous.
B. Obdurate Behavior Exception
River Ridge also argues that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to Appellees under the obdurate behavior equitable exception. The “obdurate behavior” exception to the American Rule applies when “courts impose costs upon defendants as a punishment for bringing frivolous actions or otherwise acting in bad faith.” Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d at 658 (internal citations omitted).
River Ridge argues that the obdurate behavior exception no longer exists because it has been codified in Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b). We agree….
Given our Supreme Court’s statements in Town of St. John and Loparex, we cannot say that the obdurate behavior exception to the American Rule survived the codification of Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1 and its predecessor. See, e.g., Kosarko, 979 N.E.2d at 149-50. We note, as our Supreme Court did in Kosarko, that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to render the statute and its requirements virtually meaningless—a party who failed to fulfill the statute’s requirements could merely turn to the common law for relief.” Id. at 149. Accordingly, the trial court’s use of the obdurate behavior exception to award attorney fees to Appellees is clearly erroneous.
C. Inherent Authority
In general, “[i]n the absence of statutory authority or an agreement between the parties to the contrary—or an equitable exception—a prevailing party has no right to recover attorney fees from the opposition.” C.H. v. A.R., 72 N.E.3d 996, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Appellees, however, argue that the trial court had the inherent authority to award them attorney fees as a result of River Ridge’s alleged abuses.
Our courts have recognized that a trial court has inherent authority to award attorney fees to a party under certain circumstances…
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Here, we are not dealing with a party in contempt, violations of the discovery process, or violations of other court orders. Rather, the trial court here awarded attorney fees to Appellees based on a “pattern of obdurate behavior.” See Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 29, 31, 36 (“This Court concludes that [River Ridge’s] conduct was in bad faith, obdurate, harassing . . . .”); (“litigation was in bad faith, harassing, obdurate, and the lawsuit was groundless”) (“baseless litigation”) (“advanced meritless claims”); (“negative tactics”). These complaints are grounds for an award of attorney fees under Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b), which we have found inapplicable here.6 An award of attorney fees under these circumstances would merely circumvent Indiana Code Section 34-52-1-1(b), which we cannot allow. For these reasons, we find that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly.
Conclusion
The trial court improperly ordered River Ridge to pay Appellees’ attorney fees. We reverse.
Reversed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur