Najam, J.
Charles Edward Luster appeals the trial court’s revocation of his placement in community corrections. Luster raises one issue for our review, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court violated his due process rights when it declined to consider evidence of his lack of competency prior to the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke his placement.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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On September 25, James Thompson, a security officer at Luster’s facility, was informed that Luster was acting erratically and talking to himself. Officer Thompson then reviewed footage from the facility’s security cameras. While watching the footage, Officer Thompson observed Luster engage in inappropriate sexual conduct in the laundry room, which was against the rules of the facility. The State then filed a petition to revoke Luster’s placement in community corrections due to his inappropriate conduct.
On October 1, the court appointed two medical experts to evaluate Luster’s competency because the court “ha[d] reason to believe that [Luster] may lack a present ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of [his] defense[.]” …
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The trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke Luster’s placement in community corrections. However, while the court acknowledged at the beginning of the hearing that it had ordered a competency evaluation, the court nonetheless concluded that “the statute concerning competency [Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1] contemplates [a] prejudgment [assessment] and of course this is post-judgment by a long shot.” As such, the trial court did not consider the competency evaluations but proceeded with the hearing.
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Here, the trial court appointed the medical experts to evaluate Luster’s competency pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1(a) (2018), which provides:
If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the court or the jury trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has that ability.
However, at the hearing on the State’s petition, the trial court determined that that statute “contemplates prejudgment and . . . this is post-judgment by a long shot[.]” Tr. at 2. Accordingly, the court determined that Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1 does not apply to Luster’s community corrections revocation proceeding and it declined to consider the experts’ evaluations.
On appeal, Luster maintains that the trial court erred when it concluded that that statute does not apply to his revocation proceeding because “the question of a defendant’s competency to stand trial may be raised at any time[.]” To support his contention, Luster relies on our Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith v. State, 443 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1983). However, our Supreme Court in Smith held that a defendant cannot waive the question of pretrial competency by failing to raise the issue of his competency before the fact-finder considers the merits of his criminal case. Id. at 1188-89. That is not the issue in this appeal, where Luster challenges only the ability of the trial court to consider his competency prior to a revocation hearing, not a criminal proceeding.
Luster’s incorrect reliance on Smith notwithstanding, there is no question that, as a matter of constitutional law, persons in community corrections and similar placements are entitled to competency hearings, where the facts support such a hearing, prior to the revocation of their placement. While “probationers do not receive the full array of constitutional rights that defendants at trial receive,” a probationer at a revocation hearing is entitled to the following minimum requirements of due process: notice of the claimed violations, disclosure of the
evidence against him, an opportunity to be heard and present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to a neutral and detached hearing body. Donald v. State, 930 N.E.2d 76, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). … And it is well settled that “the due process rights for revocation of community corrections placement and probation hearings are the same.” Madden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, just as a defendant has a due process right to be competent at a probation revocation hearing, a defendant participating in a community corrections revocation hearing also has a due process right to be competent during the proceedings against him.
… Because the trial court did not consider evidence of Luster’s competency prior to the hearing on the State’s petition to revoke his placement, the court violated his due process rights. We therefore reverse the trial court’s revocation of Luster’s placement in community corrections, and we remand with instructions for the trial court to consider the competency evaluations and to determine whether Luster is competent to understand and participate in the proceedings against him.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.