Baker, J.
Donnell Wilson grew up in an urban war zone and became a gang member at a young age. He was sixteen years old at the time he committed murder and other crimes. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of 181 years, which is a de facto sentence of life without parole. … The sentencing hearing did not include evidence regarding Wilson’s youth and its attendant characteristics or Wilson’s particular characteristics; as a result, it did not comply with relevant caselaw.
On post-conviction, Wilson argued that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We agree. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Wilson’s sentences and to hold a new sentencing hearing that complies with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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On August 11, 2016, Wilson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief; it was later amended by counsel on February 10, 2017, and again on August 18, 2017. Wilson argued that his sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent; that the criminal gang enhancement is unconstitutional as applied to him; and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on March 6-8, 2018. Trial and appellate counsel each testified at the hearing. Trial counsel stated that he met with Wilson five to eight times, spending forty-five to ninety minutes with him each time. … Counsel spoke with Wilson’s family but no one told him that Wilson had any mental health issues; therefore, counsel did not consider hiring a mental health expert. Wilson’s presentence investigation report stated that Wilson did not have any mental health issues.
Appellate counsel testified that at the time of Wilson’s direct appeal, he was not familiar with Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and that he did not consider challenging the constitutionality of Wilson’s sentence. … Counsel admitted that he should have raised an argument that the sentence was inappropriate pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
As part of the post-conviction proceedings, forensic psychologist Dr. Charles Ewing conducted a psychological evaluation of Wilson in August 2017. In his opinion, Wilson should have had a competency evaluation before going to trial because of his prior mental health history and the fact that he had only completed the eighth grade at the age of sixteen. Dr. Ewing diagnosed Wilson with PTSD, concluding that he had been suffering from PTSD since he was a young child. …
Developmental psychologist Dr. James Garbarino testified that at the time of the murders, Wilson was in a state of hypervigilance. … In Dr. Garbarino’s opinion, gang membership should be a mitigating factor because gangs draw their members into committing crimes. Dr. Garbarino believed that Wilson’s prospects for rehabilitation were good.
On November 21, 2018, the post-conviction court denied Wilson’s petition for post-conviction relief. …
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A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel requires a showing that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant such that “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. 2002) …
This issue will turn on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama. In Miller, two fourteen-year-old defendants were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; in neither case did the sentencing authority have discretion to impose a different punishment. 567 U.S. at 465. The Miller Court noted two relevant lines of cases—one in which it held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for children because of juveniles’ “lesser culpability,” and the other in which it prohibited the mandatory imposition of capital punishment. Id. at 470.
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The Miller Court ruled that an offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics must be taken into consideration. …
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While Miller was limited to de jure life sentences, the United States Supreme Court has remanded at least one juvenile de facto life case with instructions for the lower court to reconsider “in light of Miller v. Alabama.” Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 568 U.S. 802 (2012). Moreover, a majority of state supreme courts agree that the holding of Miller and its predecessors should be extended to juvenile de facto life sentences. …
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While our Supreme Court has not squarely considered whether a juvenile who receives a de facto life sentence is entitled to a Miller hearing, it has examined Miller in another context. In Brown v. State, our Supreme Court considered the appropriateness of a 150-year sentence for a juvenile under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). 10 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 2014). … Our Supreme Court revised Brown’s sentence to eighty years and did not address the Eighth Amendment.
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We find that Miller applies to sentences for juveniles that amount to a life sentence, regardless of the label applied by the trial court or the State. In other words, if the effect of a sentence is that the juvenile will remain in prison for the rest of his days, with no meaningful opportunity to gain early release based on demonstrated rehabilitation, then that defendant has the right to a Miller sentencing hearing.
That conclusion, of course, begs the question of what, precisely, is required by Miller. The United States Supreme Court explained that its holding required “that a sentence follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 483. …
It is not enough, therefore, to simply acknowledge the defendant’s youth. A Miller hearing requires more. While we do not intend to create specific requirements or an exhaustive list, we note that a Miller hearing will likely include expert testimony, which would ideally cover both the attendant characteristics of youth in general and the particular youth and characteristics of the defendant being sentenced.
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We can only conclude that trial counsel’s failure to present any evidence related to youth and its attendant characteristics or to Wilson’s own youth, environment, mental health, good character, or prospects of rehabilitation resulted in a hearing that was deficient and non-compliant with Miller. In other words, counsel’s performance was deficient.
We can likewise only conclude that the absence of the above-described evidence prejudiced Wilson. The sentencing court cited Wilson’s age as the sole mitigating factor, though giving it minimal weight, and found two aggravating factors—Wilson’s history of juvenile adjudications and the fact that he had committed multiple offenses involving separate and distinct victims. … We find that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, Wilson would have received a lesser sentence.
In sum, we find that the post-conviction court erred by finding that Wilson did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we resolve the case in this fashion, we need not and will not address Wilson’s remaining arguments, including the constitutionality of the criminal gang activity sentence enhancement as applied to him. Should he choose to appeal the sentence imposed after his new sentencing hearing, he is free to raise that argument again.
The judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate Wilson’s sentences and to hold a new sentencing hearing that complies with Miller.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.