Robb, J.
Following a bench trial, Josh McBride was convicted of intimidation, a Level 5 felony, and sentenced to four years in the Indiana Department of Correction, with one year to be served on adult day reporting and three years suspended to supervised probation. McBride now appeals his conviction, raising the following dispositive issue for our review: whether his conviction of intimidation is supported by sufficient evidence. The State cross-appeals,
raising the issue of whether McBride should be unequivocally prohibited from possessing a firearm during his term of probation. Concluding there was sufficient evidence supporting McBride’s conviction of intimidation and that the State’s point is well-taken, we affirm the conviction and remand for further proceedings.
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The trial court sentenced McBride to four years in the Department of Correction, with one year to be served on Level One Adult Day Reporting and three years suspended to supervised probation. One of the terms of his probation provided,
You shall not purchase, possess, or use any firearm, destructive device or other dangerous or deadly weapon unless granted written permission by the Court or your Probation Officer.
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 3 at 222 (emphasis added). However, a No Contact Order While On Probation was also issued at the time of McBride’s sentencing stating that he was to have no contact with the Church and its members and that he was “to have no firearms, deadly weapons, or ammunition in [his] possession.”
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The State’s cross-appeal alleges this case should be remanded to the trial court to impose as a condition of probation that McBride is prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 922(g). Specifically, the State takes issue with the language in McBride’s conditions of probation that he could be granted permission to have a firearm. The State argues neither the trial court nor the probation department would have authority to grant such permission, as a federal statute prohibits a convicted felon from possessing or receiving a firearm “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). McBride responds that the State’s argument is not ripe because there is no claim that McBride has even requested, let alone been granted, permission to possess a firearm.
… The no contact order also references 18 U.S.C. section 922(g). It appears, therefore, that the trial court is aware of the restrictions on convicted felons contained in federal law. Nonetheless, there is an obvious conflict in the trial court’s orders. Further, with respect to McBride’s ripeness argument, the terms of probation may be modified at any time regardless of whether a probation violation has occurred. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.8; see also Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 700, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We therefore remand this case for the trial court to modify the terms of McBride’s probation to remove the conditional language and unequivocally state that he is not permitted to have a firearm during his probation.
The State presented sufficient evidence from which the trial court, as the trier of fact in McBride’s bench trial, could conclude that McBride was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of intimidation. We therefore affirm McBride’s conviction.
However, because the trial court imposed a term of probation that both conflicts with another term and with federal law, we remand to the trial court to modify the terms of probation consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.