Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants-Plaintiffs, The Estate of Charles D. Benefiel, by and through its Co-Personal Representatives, Michael D. Benefiel and Andrea D. Kessner, and the Estate of Linda D. Benefiel, by and through its Co-Personal Representatives Michael D. Benefiel and Andrea D. Kessner (collectively, the Estate), appeal the verdict in favor of Appellee-Defendant, Wright Hardware Co., Inc. (Wright Hardware), in a negligence case arising out of a propane gas explosion wherein Charles and Linda Benefiel were killed.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
ISSUES
The Estate raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting a defense expert witness to read verbatim into evidence an opinion set forth in an email to the defense expert witness.
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The Estate contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain testimony by Wight Hardware’s expert. Focusing on Hetrick’s reading of Gress’ opinion of the meaning of interruption of service, the Estate maintains that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, offered for its truth, and was prejudicial to the Estate’s rights to a fair verdict.
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At the heart of this appeal is the direct testimony by Wright Hardware’s expert, Hetrick, regarding his investigation of the explosion. As part of his investigation, Hetrick reached out to the ICC in request for a staff opinion. In his email, Hetrick “asked [the ICC] [] what they meant by interruption of service.” (Tr. Vol. V, p. 58). Gress, ICC’s employee, responded to Hetrick’s email. The response supported Wright Hardware’s position that a leak test was not required under the circumstances presented here, and therefore no negligence had been incurred. During direct testimony, counsel for Wright Hardware sought to question Hetrick as to each question he had queried to the ICC and the verbatim answer he received. The Estate objected,… Characterizing the interpretation of interruption of service as the “million dollar question everybody wants to know,” the trial court noted that a “brief definition [] is really needed for the jury to make a decision” and ruled that
That one sentence definition [of interruption of service] I’m going to allow to be read in. The other[] [questions], they get more specific in facts applying to the case. I think those really more are for the jury to decide. I will allow those questions to be relayed and you can question as we discussed, but I’m not going to allow the verbatim answers to be read. But, I do want that interruption of service definition in.
(Tr. Vol. V, pp. 64, 74, & 75). The Estate now claims that Hetrick’s expert testimony merely served as an improper vehicle to present the otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence of Gress’ definition in front of the jury.
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Hetrick explained to the jury that because the IFGC did not define the term, he reached out to the ICC “in request for a staff opinion.” (Tr. Vol. V, p. 58). Hetrick affirmed that he received a reply and read to the jury verbatim the definition of interruption of service provided by Gress. Although it is clear that Gress is not a member of ICC’s legal department, no evidence of Gress’ educational background, qualifications, or expertise was introduced, besides the fact that he is an employee of the ICC. Rather, it appears that Gress represented his own non-binding interpretation of a legal term within the context of the ICC only, and did not interpret the term within the context and revisions of the Indiana Code. The reliability of the interpretation, as well as the expertise of Gress, could not be challenged through cross-examination. Accordingly, without being informed of Gress’ qualifications or Gress himself being available for cross-examination, we cannot say that Gress’ opinion could be reasonably relied upon by Hetrick.
Moreover the admission of the verbatim definition was prejudicial to the Estate and constituted reversible error. Termed “the million dollar question,” and battled over by experts on both sides, the jury was handed a definition of ‘interruption of service’ which was represented to be issued by the entity that also wrote the Code and purported to provide a definitive answer on an ultimate issue. (Tr. Vol. V, p. 64). During closing argument, counsel for Wright Hardware explained to the jury that because there was a disagreement on the definition, Hetrick contacted the ICC to “please help us to find what interruption of service is[.]” (Tr. Vol. V, p. 168). As such the jury was given the impression that this definition, interpreting the IFGC, was cloaked with authority to equally define the term in the Indiana Code. It was only after Gress’ opinion was read verbatim that Hetrick affirmed that his own opinion aligned with the definition provided by Gress. Viewed in the totality of the trial proceedings, Hetrick’s testimony in essence amounted to nothing more than a mere conduit to get otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence in front of the jury.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s admission of a verbatim hearsay opinion which was read into evidence by the defense expert witness was prejudicial to the Estate and amounted to reversible error.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Bailey, J. and Pyle, J. concur