Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue
In January 2015, Joan Tutino’s 2004 Honda CR-V was serviced by Bob Rohrman Indy Honda for a recall related to the vehicle’s airbag. In July 2015, Tutino was injured in a four-car crash in which her driver’s side airbag failed to deploy. Tutino filed a complaint for damages against Rohr-Motors, Inc. d/b/a Bob Rohrman’s Indy Honda, and Bob Rohrman Honda Dealership Service Department d/b/a Bob Rohrman Honda Service Department (collectively, “Rohrman”) alleging that Rohrman negligently serviced her vehicle resulting in the airbag failing to deploy and that Rohrman failed to notify her the airbag was defective prior to the accident. The trial court granted Rohrman’s motion for summary judgment. Tutino now appeals the trial court’s grant of Rohrman’s motion for summary judgment, raising the following issue for our review: whether the designated evidence created a genuine issue of material fact that precluded judgment as a matter of law for Rohrman. Concluding any issues of fact are not material to the resolution of this case and that Rohrman was entitled to summary judgment, we affirm.
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Tutino argues that a jury must decide whether Rohrman is responsible for the airbag failing to deploy because there is conflicting evidence on whether the recall work was properly done and whether the airbag should have deployed in this particular collision. Even if we accept Tutino’s position that Rohrman either did not perform the recall work in January at all or did not perform it correctly because it did not replace the airbag inflator, and even if we accept her position that her collision should have caused the airbag to deploy, her claim still fails. [Footnote omitted.] Rohrman designated evidence that the recall work was performed and performed correctly and that the threshold for deploying the airbag was not reached in this collision, but more relevantly, Rohrman also designated evidence that “[n]o recalls applicable to the Honda CRV affect whether the SRS ECU deploys airbags during a crash. Specifically, the . . . recalls do not affect whether airbags should or should not deploy during a crash.” Id. at 60 (emphasis added). In turn, Tutino designated evidence that the threshold for deploying the airbag was reached, creating an issue of fact, but when it came to tying the recall work to the airbag deployment, her expert essentially aligned with Rohrman’s, agreeing that the recall did not have anything to do with airbag deployment and that he had no evidence to indicate otherwise. See id. at 213.5 Thus, there is no issue as to the material fact of whether the recall work Rohrman performed could be responsible for the failure of the airbag to deploy in Tutino’s accident. See Romero v. Brady, 5 N.E.3d 1166, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that the genuine issues of material fact identified by the nonmovant “are not material questions of fact because they do not bear on the ultimate resolution of a relevant issue” and thus, even if the facts are as the nonmovant alleges, the nonmovant failed to show that those facts impact potential liability), trans. denied.
We acknowledge Tutino’s legal argument that based upon Hughley, “there is a very, very, low threshold for an individual . . . to escape a Summary Judgment Motion and there’s an extremely high threshold for the movant . . . .” Transcript, Volume II at 17; see also Appellant’s Brief at 8. That Hughley sets a high bar for a summary judgment movant is undeniably true, as is the fact that Hughley determined even a “perfunctory and self-serving” affidavit was sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 15 N.E.3d at 1004. But Hughley does not eliminate summary judgment in favor of letting every case in which the summary judgment opponent designates any evidence go to trial; it simply reiterates that Indiana has a heightened standard for granting summary judgment that can be defeated on “thin” evidence as long as the evidence raises a factual issue. Id. at 1005. Here, Passwater’s affidavit, as supplemented by his deposition that elaborated on and clarified his conclusions, did not raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether the work Rohrman performed or did not perform on Tutino’s vehicle affected whether her airbag would deploy in a front-end crash. We note, however, that Rohrman’s characterizes Tutino’s argument as “simply to state, ‘Jury. Jury. Jury. Hughley. Hughley. Hughley.’” Brief of Appellees at 35. [Footnote omitted.] This response unnecessarily minimizes Tutino’s reliance on a legitimate part of Indiana’s summary judgment practice – emphasizing Indiana’s unique standard. That we ultimately agree with Rohrman that Hughley does not preclude summary judgment in this case should not be taken to mean that we agree with Rohrman’s dismissive manner of making its argument.
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Conclusion
As Rohrman demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue and Tutino failed to come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue remained for trial, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Rohrman. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.