Baker, J.
Bryce Burton appeals the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Martin Benner, arguing that the trial court erred by finding as a matter of law that Benner was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of a vehicle accident. We agree. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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If it is found that Benner was working within the scope of his employment with the Indiana State Police, he is immune from personal liability for the accident. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b)-(c). As a general matter, usually discussed in the context of the respondeat superior doctrine, “‘it is well established that whether an employee’s actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder.’” Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788, 794 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)).
In this case, the salient facts are undisputed. Benner is employed by the Indiana State Police. At the time of the accident, he was driving a police vehicle, but the vehicle was unmarked. Benner was wearing street clothes, was not on duty, and was traveling from home to his son’s baseball game when the accident occurred. He was authorized to use his police vehicle for personal purposes but was required to (and did) maintain radio contact in case of emergency situations. After Burton’s accident, Benner stopped to provide assistance although he, himself, had not been affected by the accident.
While the facts are without dispute, the inferences that can be made from and conclusions that can be based on those facts are anything but. One reasonable factfinder could look at these facts and easily conclude that Benner was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Another reasonable factfinder could reach precisely the opposite conclusion. Given our standard of review on summary judgment and our Supreme Court’s caution that summary judgment should not be used to “short-circuit[] the trial process” where even a “minimal[]” amount of evidence raises a factual issue to be resolved at trial, Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004-05, we can only find that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of Benner on this issue.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. N
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.