Brown, J.
Kevin Yafet Mendoza Bonilla aka Kevin Yafeth Mendoza Bonilla (“Kevin”) appeals the trial court’s paternity order and denial of an amended order. Kevin raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court had the authority and duty to make requisite findings on his special immigrant juvenile status in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). We reverse and remand.
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“Federal law provides a path to lawful permanent residency in the United States to resident alien children who qualify for ‘special immigrant juvenile’ (SIJ) status.” Matter of Guardianship of Luis, 114 N.E.3d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11). “Congress created the SIJ classification to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned immigrant youth through a process allowing them to become legal permanent citizens.” Id. (quoting In the Interest of J.J.X.C., a Child, 318 Ga. App. 420, 424, 734 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)).
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In Luis, the Court observed that the trial court’s order was silent regarding any decision on the SIJ factors despite the petitioner’s request and that the trial court did not state a basis for declining to make SIJ findings or that it had considered the SIJ findings and rejected them. Id. at 859. We held that, “[a]lthough the trial court is authorized to conclude that the petitioner failed to present evidence to support the SIJ factors or that the presented evidence was not credible, the court nevertheless has a duty to consider the SIJ factors and to make findings.” Id. The Court also held that, “[i]n this unusual setting, where a state court is charged with addressing an issue relevant only to federal immigration law, we cannot affirm the trial court’s Order without some positive indication that the court actually addressed [the petitioner’s] request.” Id. We concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to make findings on the petitioner’s immigrant juvenile status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) and remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider the request for SIJ findings in light of the evidence presented and articulate the relevant determinations pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Id.
In the present case, while the trial court stated in its October 4, 2018 order denying the entry of an amended order that it “cannot make a finding based upon the application of federal law and there is no comparable basis for a finding of abandonment within the Indiana state paternity statutory authority,” the court had already found in its July 23, 2018 order that, “[f]or all intents and purposes, [Father] effectively abandoned the child at birth, leaving Mother as the sole care provider” and that Father “effectively abandoned the child at birth, having provided no physical, emotional or financial support of the child in 18 years.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 119, 125.
Conclusion
Based upon the record, Indiana statutory law, and in light of Luis, we conclude that Kevin has established prima facie error and we remand for the trial court to consider the request for SIJ findings and articulate the relevant determinations pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions.
Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur