Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Respondent, J.R. (Mother), appeals the juvenile court’s denial of her motion to dismiss the petition of Appellees’-Petitioners’, Department of Child Services (DCS) and Child Advocates, Inc., (collectively, DCS), alleging that her minor child, R.N.L. (Child), is a child in need of services (CHINS).
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
ISSUE
Mother presents one issue on appeal: Whether the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the instant CHINS case.
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…DCS does not dispute that the juvenile court had proper jurisdiction over the 2017 CHINS, the 2017 CHINS was rendered on the merits, or that the identity of the parties in both proceedings was the same. Rather, DCS contends that res judicata did not bar the 2018 CHINS because “the matter at issue here was not, or could not have been, previously litigated.”2 (Appellants’ Br. p. 13).
Our examination of the matters contained in the 2017 CHINS petition, the juvenile court’s order denying the 2017 CHINS, the 2018 Preliminary Inquiry, and the 2018 CHINS petition leads us to conclude that a number of the issues litigated by DCS in the 2018 CHINS were, or could have been, litigated in the 2017 CHINS. [Footnote omitted.] Indeed, the allegation that Mother was currently involved in the J.L. CHINS and the allegation that services had not been completed in that case contained in the 2017 CHINS were simply duplicated in the 2018 CHINS.
Other matters alleged in the 2018 CHINS could have been determined in 2017 CHINS proceeding but were not. For example, Mother completed a psychological evaluation in February of 2017 and was diagnosed with schizophrenia with symptoms of psychosis and PTSD, among other conditions. Despite these diagnoses being known, DCS made no allegations in the 2017 CHINS petition, filed on November 7, 2017, based specifically on Mother’s psychological evaluation or her failure to follow any concomitant care recommendations. Likewise, the juvenile court’s order denying the 2017 CHINS made no findings or conclusions specifically based on Mother’s mental health diagnoses and treatment plan. However, in its 2018 CHINS petition, filed four days after the juvenile court entered its order denying the previous petition, DCS alleged that “Mother completed a psychological evaluation but has not followed through with her mental health treatment, and she admitted not taking her medication.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 72-73). There is nothing in the record to indicate that this allegation was based on new information that was not known to DCS at the time it filed the 2017 CHINS. DCS argues that evidence at the August 2018 fact-finding hearing on the 2018 CHINS indicated that Mother had not seen her therapist since May 2018, had not seen her doctor since June 2018, and that Mother was not taking her medication. However, this information was not before the juvenile court at the time that it decided Mother’s dismissal motion, as there was nothing in the 2018 Preliminary Inquiry which supported these allegations.
An examination of the litigation of the issue of Mother’s ability and willingness to parent yields a similar result. The 2017 CHINS petition alleged that Mother “has not successfully demonstrated an ability and willingness to appropriately care for [Child][.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). After fact-finding had occurred, the juvenile court concluded in denying the 2017 CHINS that it was “uncontroverted that Mother has a stable home, that she knows of local community-based resources that are easily accessible to her, and that [M]other’s parenting skills have improved.” Yet, four days after the entry of this finding, DCS alleged in the 2018 CHINS that, “[d]espite the therapist involved teaching parenting skills for a year, [Mother] still struggles with basic care of infants, which includes not knowing how much formula to feed them and not being willing to change their diapers.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 73). Again, although the 2018 Preliminary Inquiry contained a report by the home-based therapist dated March 4, 2018, to this effect, there is nothing in that report that indicates that these were conditions which had changed since the filing of the 2017 CHINS or even the last fact-finding in that matter.
Similarly, the 2018 CHINS alleged that Mother and Father “have a very aggressive relationship, and [Mother] has reported in the past that [Father] hit her.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 73). This was an issue which was known to DCS at the time of the filing of the 2017 CHINS, could have been litigated in those proceedings, but apparently was not, as the trial court made no findings in its denial order regarding the issue. There is nothing in the record before us indicating that any new acts of domestic violence had occurred between Mother and Father that were unknown to DCS at the time of the 2017 CHINS litigation or that had occurred since the last fact-finding hearing in that matter on January 26, 2018.
The issues of Mother’s compliance with services in J.L.’s CHINS, her mental health, her parenting abilities, and domestic violence were either already litigated or were known to DCS at the time that it filed and litigated its 2017 CHINS, and thus, re-litigation of those issues was barred by res judicata. See M.G., 74 N.E.3d at 264. In reaching our conclusion, we are cognizant of the fact that circumstances change as CHINS proceedings unfold and that the purpose of the CHINS statute is to protect children. We do not intend to downplay the seriousness of the allegations contained in the 2018 CHINS. However, parents have a right to be free of vexatious and repetitious litigation, and we are concerned with the manner in which DCS litigated this case.
In its order granting the 2018 CHINS, the juvenile court made findings regarding issues which we have determined should have been dismissed. For example, the juvenile court entered at least ten findings regarding the results of Mother’s mental health evaluation based on information known to DCS at the time it filed its 2017 CHINS, and it found the domestic violence between Mother and Father to have occurred “‘through the lifespan of this case.’” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 180) (quote not attributed in the original). However, in the 2018 CHINS, DCS did allege a new circumstance supporting its allegation that Mother had failed to supply Child with a safe and stable home based upon Mother’s report to FCM Whittaker on March 2, 2018, that her home was unfit for a baby. Mother argues that, because the juvenile court had already denied the 2017 CHINS when FCM Whittaker requested a home visit and no report of abuse or neglect had been initiated by an outside party, FCM Whittaker had no authority to investigate Mother. Although we are troubled by the timing of FCM Whittaker’s call to Mother and subsequent detention of Child, FCM Whittaker was still acting as case manager in the J.L. CHINS at the time she made her request to Mother. [Footnote omitted.] Contrary to Mother’s assertions, nothing in the CHINS statute requires that a so-called “310” report, which is a third-party report of abuse or neglect of a child, is necessary to remove a child. Indeed, a caseworker is authorized to take a child into custody if the caseworker has probable cause to believe the child is a CHINS, without reference to a third-party report. See I.C. § 31-34-2-3.
There was also information in the 2018 Preliminary Inquiry regarding Mother failing to provide formula for Child on February 8, 2018, and reports taken on February 26 and 28, 2018, regarding Mother’s housing instability which supported DCS’s allegations in its 2018 CHINS petition that Mother had not provided a stable, safe home and still struggled with basic infant care. Inasmuch as these facts occurred after the last fact-finding hearing in the 2017 CHINS, they could not have been litigated in the prior proceeding. Therefore, we remand with instructions to the juvenile court to reconsider the 2018 CHINS as to Mother without reliance on issues that were already litigated or could have been litigated at the time of the 2017 CHINS.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court erred when it failed to dismiss those claims made by DCS in its 2018 CHINS petition which had already been litigated or which could have been litigated in the 2017 CHINS.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bailey, J. and Pyle, J. concur