Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
Shaun Perrill (“Husband”) filed this interlocutory appeal after the trial court concluded there was no enforceable premarital agreement (the “Agreement”) between Husband and Brandy Perrill (“Wife”). We reverse and remand.
Issues
Husband raises several issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred in concluding there was no meeting of the minds between the parties to form an enforceable contract.
II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to admit testimony regarding Wife’s excluded property.
III. Whether the trial court erred in concluding the Agreement was unconscionable.
….
At the outset, it appears that the question of the parties’ intent and whether there was a meeting of the minds is focused squarely on the attachment of Exhibit A. The trial court first found that there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties because Wife claims that she attached Exhibit A to the Agreement, whereas Husband claims that Wife did not. The trial court implies that Exhibit A is essential and, accordingly, concludes that it could not enforce the agreement without the meeting of the minds on this essential term.
….
Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Agreement, excluded property for Wife would include “all property shown in Exhibit A, including any income, dividends, increase or decrease in value, or proceeds with respect to such property, and any gifts or inheritances later received from her family,” whereas Husband’s excluded property was defined separately in the first nine pages of the Agreement. Id. at 152…
….
While we agree that Wife’s Exhibit A would give more context to identify Wife’s premarital property, the identification of the property itself is not essential. In Hunsberger v. Hunsberger, 653 N.E.2d 118, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), a panel of this court reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the antenuptial agreement between the parties was invalid and unenforceable. Specifically, the trial court found that the antenuptial agreement was invalid and unenforceable “because [the husband] did not disclose his assets and their value to [the wife] before she signed the agreement.” Id…
Here, the trial court ultimately concluded that Wife did attach Exhibit A when the parties executed the Agreement. Exhibit A, as evidenced by the parties’ intent in the main Agreement, was intended to identify Wife’s excluded property in the event of dissolution or death. The actual list of excluded property can be easily recreated and was not an essential term relating to the intent of the parties. This is especially true when the intent of the main portion of the Agreement was clear. The trial court expressly found that the “first nine (9) pages of the First Version of Executed Antenuptial Agreement and the first nine (9) pages of the Second Version of Executed Antenuptial agreement are identical.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. This is important because, as a reviewing Court, we do not reweigh the evidence. Instead, we merely review the Agreement to determine whether the parties’ intent is clear.
….
Ultimately, the terms of the contract do not change with time, whereas the parties’ actual property is fluid and everchanging. The Agreement ultimately contemplates the potential for change in defining excluded property, using terms such as “any gifts or inheritance later received. . .,” and “now owned by Husband or received in the future by Husband.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 152. In other words, the parties’ Agreement already contemplated that each party would be required to later identify property that fit within the definition of excluded property.
All essential contractual elements were present in the Agreement with or without Exhibit A or B. Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that there was no contract between the parties. The mere fact that Exhibit A was missing does not render the entire contract unenforceable. Exhibit A was designed to identify Wife’s specific excluded property at the time she signed the Agreement.
…..
The lack of an Exhibit A does not make the Agreement unconscionable. Even if the trial court believed the Agreement was unfair because Wife would receive less, this does not make the Agreement unconscionable. See Rider, 669 N.E.2d at 164 (concluding that, even in the case where “enforcement of this contract eventually may force [Wife] to sell her home, [it] cannot find enforcement of this antenuptial agreement to be unconscionable,” and that the case “does not involve a situation where, following divorce, one spouse is left with considerable assets while the other spouse is left virtually penniless, with no means of support”). Accordingly, to the extent the trial court found that the agreement was unconscionable, the trial court erred.
Conclusion
The trial court erred in concluding there was not an enforceable prenuptial agreement between the parties. We reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur