Goff, Justice.
In what can only be characterized as a twist of fate, Anthony Bedolla found himself sharing a holding cell with the man who could help prove he had been wrongly convicted of murder. Securing the man’s testimony and presenting it to the post-conviction court proved challenging for Bedolla’s attorney for various reasons, some outside her control. After an unsuccessful deposition, yet with assurances from the witness that he would cooperate, Bedolla’s counsel sought leave from the court to try again to get the testimony. But the post-conviction court refused to hear argument from Bedolla’s attorney on this point, even denying her the opportunity to make an offer of proof. The court then ended discovery, closed the evidence, and demanded proposed findings and conclusions from the parties. When Bedolla’s counsel attempted to make her case and develop a record for appeal, the court silenced her with threats of contempt.
Part of a judge’s job is to listen. In re Van Walters v. Bd. of Children’s Guardians of Marion Cty., 132 Ind. 567, 571, 32 N.E. 568, 569 (1892) (stating judges must “hear with deliberation, act with impartiality, and decide upon the law and the evidence”) (emphasis added). When a judge refuses to hear a party’s offer to prove, she not only abdicates the duty to listen, but she calls into question the principle of fundamental fairness, which requires that parties, particularly those bearing the burden of proof, receive every reasonable opportunity to make their case. Hirsch v. State, 697 N.E.2d 37, 43 (Ind. 1998). Today we hold that a post-conviction court abuses its discretion when it denies a party’s legitimate request to make an offer of proof.
In the wee hours of March 8, 2009, Erick Espinoza was shot and killed in an Indianapolis nightclub’s parking lot. Multiple witnesses placed Anthony Bedolla in the parking lot, but only one witness identified him as the killer. The State eventually charged Bedolla with murder and cocaine possession. Following a bench trial in February 2010, the court found
Bedolla guilty as charged and sentenced him to 45 years in prison. See Bedolla v. State, No. 49A02-1003-CR-368, 2011 WL 240152, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2011), trans. denied.
In October 2011, after exhausting direct appeals, Bedolla sought postconviction relief. He twice amended his petition over the years before the court held an evidentiary hearing on January 11, 2017. After that hearing, while Bedolla sat in a Marion County Jail holding cell awaiting transport back to prison, he met Miguel Barragan-Lopez. The two cellmates struck up a conversation and Barragan-Lopez provided information that, if true, would exonerate Bedolla.
Barragan-Lopez told Bedolla that he knew Sarai Solano—the one witness that testified she saw Bedolla shoot Espinoza—and she told him that another man committed the murder. Specifically, Barragan-Lopez recounted he had a brief relationship with Solano and she confided to him that Jose Reyes (her old boyfriend) shot and killed Espinoza, not Bedolla.
Bedolla relayed this information to his post-conviction attorney (“Counsel”) and asked her to investigate. Counsel talked with both Barragan-Lopez and his attorney. In April 2017, Counsel submitted a third amendment to Bedolla’s PCR petition, alleging newly discovered evidence revealed a different killer and entitled him to a new trial. …
On July 19, 2017, Counsel attempted to take Barragan-Lopez’s recorded statement, but he refused to go on the record without a court order. … She moved for leave to depose Barragan-Lopez and attached the subpoena to the motion. … The State did not respond to Counsel’s motion and the court later granted it.
On September 13, 2017, Counsel travelled to Kentucky to depose Barragan-Lopez. The State participated via video conference. Shortly into the deposition, the State objected to Counsel’s leading questions … After listening to the back-and-forth between the attorneys, Barragan-Lopez said he could help Bedolla, but he did not want to get into trouble. … Before leaving the room, Barragan-Lopez told Counsel: “I know that you feel bad because I want to leave. But if you come back with my attorney, I will answer all of the questions you have.” …
One week later, the parties appeared before the post-conviction court for a status hearing. …
The State then objected to further depositions since Barragan-Lopez twice refused to talk. …
Counsel then explained her efforts and the subsequent roadblocks to her getting Barragan-Lopez’s testimony before the court. … After hearing argument from the State alone on the issue of whether Barragan-Lopez had counsel or would provide admissible evidence, the Court said:
Okay. We’re done. The Court is going to show evidence is closed on this. I’ve done everything the Court needs to do. …
… Counsel began to ask permission to briefly respond to the State’s arguments, but the post-conviction court cut her off with a curt, “No.” …
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… With that, the status hearing the post-conviction court intended to vacate ended.
Bedolla filed a motion to correct error, making two distinct arguments. First, Bedolla argued that the post-conviction court erred in denying Counsel the chance to make an offer of proof. Second, he argued the postconviction court erred in refusing to hear Counsel’s argument concerning Bedolla’s right under the Trial Rules to request sanctions against Barragan-Lopez. …
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Although the parties’ arguments present issues related to the Indiana Constitution’s Open Courts clause, or the scope and application of the Indiana Trial Rules in post-conviction proceedings, or the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, or when newly discovered evidence is considered merely impeaching—we view these issues as premature considering the record before us. Rather, the dispositive issue here, in our view, is whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in closing evidence without allowing Counsel to make an offer of proof and thus foreclosing enforcement of a valid subpoena to secure a deposition. It is to address this issue alone that we now grant transfer.
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Trial courts undoubtedly shoulder a heavy burden in assuring justice is served speedily and efficiently while maintaining the parties’ rights. But does a trial court abuse its discretion as gatekeeper by denying a party’s legitimate offer of proof and thereby closing evidence and foreclosing discovery sanctions? Based on the specific facts before us, we answer yes.
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Looking at this record, we see the post-conviction court abused its discretion in preventing Counsel from making an offer of proof concerning Barragan-Lopez’s anticipated testimony. Bedolla believed Barragan-Lopez’s testimony could prove his actual innocence and Counsel tried to secure the evidence through discovery. We note that until the status hearing, the State had not opposed the deposition. Likewise, the State made no argument that Counsel had been dilatory in getting Barragan-Lopez’s deposition or that Counsel had abused the discovery process or that the State would be prejudiced in continuing the matter to allow for another deposition. Yet the postconviction court, after hearing only the State’s argument, refused to listen to Counsel’s offer of proof and warned that a deputy would remove her if she did not yield her spot at counsel’s table. Id. at 42–43. In our view, the post-conviction court “respond[ed] to [this] factual context in an unreasonable manner.” Tapia, 753 N.E.2d at 585.
… The post-conviction court’s refusal to hear further argument and its intemperate demeanor amount to an abuse of discretion—they even undermine the fundamental fairness the Indiana Constitution demands. See Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 828 (Ind. 2009) (“[W]e have found that the Indiana Constitution assumes and demands fundamental fairness in all judicial proceedings.”). We, therefore, reverse the post-conviction court’s order denying Bedolla’s motion to correct error.
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But having found reversible error in refusing the offer to prove, we now must determine the necessary relief. Bedolla’s transfer petition presented us with two options for relief: allow for discovery sanctions and allow more time for the deposition. … Since the record before us contains the essential information for an offer to prove—the proposed testimony’s substance, relevance, and potential admissibility—we consider that and conclude Bedolla should be permitted to proceed with the deposition.
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For these reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court’s order denying Bedolla’s motion to correct error and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Chief Justice Rush and Justice David concur.
Justice Massa concurs in result.
Justice Slaughter concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., concurs that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow counsel to make an offer to prove, but dissents in exceeding the relief sought by awarding defendant the right to take a deposition of the witness.