Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Kirk S. Freeman, a Lafayette-based attorney, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his defamation complaint against Tippecanoe Superior Court Magistrate Tricia L. Thompson for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Freeman raises a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether Magistrate Thompson has immunity from Freeman’s allegation that she defamed him when she reported to courthouse law enforcement officers that Freeman was in possession of a firearm inside the Tippecanoe County Courthouse in violation of state law and local ordinance. We hold that Magistrate Thompson is immune from Freeman’s allegation, and, as such, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Freeman’s complaint.
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We have no hesitation concluding that Magistrate Thompson’s report to law enforcement within the Tippecanoe County Courthouse that a person inside the courthouse was in possession of a firearm, in violation of state law and local ordinance, was an act taken in her judicial capacity. As to the first Stump factor, it is beyond dispute that our trial judges have “considerable discretion in matters of maintaining order and security for the courtroom . . . .” Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 169 n.11 (Ind. 1997); see also In re Courthouse Security in Tippecanoe Cnty., 765 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ind. 2002) (“We would expect that the Sheriff would continue to work, as always, with the local judiciary to understand and address their particularized security concerns.”).
As to the second factor, a magistrate or other member of the judiciary who makes an in-courthouse report of a security concern is dealing with others from her position as a member of the judiciary. And, as to the third factor, Magistrate Thompson’s report plainly involved the exercise of her discretion in maintaining security and was not a mere ministerial act. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Magistrate Thompson is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for her report—even if erroneously made—of Freeman’s alleged possession of a firearm inside the Tippecanoe County Courthouse.
Nonetheless, Freeman asserts on appeal that Magistrate Thompson did not act in her judicial capacity but rather out of retaliation for his APRA request and his open discussion of Pinner. We cannot agree. Freeman’s assertions go to Magistrate Thompson’s intent, not to whether she was acting in her judicial capacity. Because we have determined that Magistrate Thompson’s report to law enforcement was a judicial act, her intent is immaterial. We have long recognized that “judicial immunity is granted even when judges act maliciously or corruptly.” Martin v. Heffelfinger, 744 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Lake Cnty. Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied). Accordingly, Freeman cannot show that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.