Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
Dunham’s Athleisure Corp. (“Dunham’s”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on Keith Shepherd’s complaint in which Shepherd alleged, among other claims, Dunham’s negligence in the sale of a firearm to a third party. Dunham’s presents a single dispositive issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it denied Dunham’s summary judgment motion.
We reverse
….
Indiana Code Section 34-12-3-3 (2018) provides:
Except as provided in section 5(1) or 5(2)[3] of this chapter, a person may not bring or maintain an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or seller for:
(1) recovery of damages resulting from, or injunctive relief or abatement of a nuisance relating to, the lawful:
(A) design;
(B) manufacture;
(C) marketing; or
(D) sale;
of a firearm or ammunition for a firearm; or
(2) recovery of damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a firearm or ammunition for a firearm by a third party.
Our Supreme Court recently recognized that this statute “functions as an immunity provision” and “forecloses aggrieved plaintiffs from bringing suit” for recovery of damages4 against a firearms seller “even if the firearm has been sold unlawfully.” KS&E Sports v. Runnells, 72 N.E.3d 892, 899-900 (Ind. 2017)…
Here, each of Shepherd’s claims against Dunham’s arises out of the alleged unlawful sale of a firearm to Bowman, who then shot Shepherd. Bowman’s conduct amounts to “criminal or unlawful misuse of a firearm . . . by a third party.” [FN 5: To the extent “third party” may have been ambiguous in this statute, our Supreme Court plainly refers to Blackburn, the buyer, or first party in the context of the firearm sale, as a third party in the context of Runnells’ lawsuit against KS&E and the statute. KS&E, 72 N.E.3d at 901. Thus, here, Bowman, the buyer, is a third party under the statute in the context of Shepherd’s lawsuit against Dunham’s, and subsection (2) applies to her criminal misuse of the firearm.] I.C. § 34-12-3-3(2). Following the holding of KS&E, we conclude that Dunham’s is immune from liability as a matter of law. See id. Thus, the trial court erred when it denied Dunham’s summary judgment motion.
Reversed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.