Bailey, J.
Following a bench trial, Alfonso Artigas (“Artigas”) was found not guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor. He was, however, found guilty of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least .08 but less than .15 g/100mL of blood—even though the stipulated blood test presented only a range from .07 to .084 g/100mL. Artigas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conviction. We reverse.
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Artigas was charged and convicted under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-1(a), under the portion of that statute criminalizing “operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol but less than fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per . . . one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s blood.” In challenging his conviction, Artigas focuses on the report indicating that his blood alcohol concentration was equivalent to somewhere from .07 to .084 g/100mL. Pointing to this range—most of which falls below the statutory threshold—Artigas argues that “nothing in the record supports the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Artigas’[s] actual whole blood alcohol concentration was at least [.080 g/100mL], rather than below [0.080 g/100mL].”
The State counters that there was “evidence of [Artigas’s] whole blood alcohol concentration level, a range that included 0.08 and above.” According to the State, “law enforcement observations bolster the lab results offered.” …
The State misplaces its focus on visible signs of impairment. Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-1(a) creates strict liability for operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration within the specified range, irrespective of whether the operator exhibits signs of intoxication. Compare I.C. § 9-30-5-1 (criminalizing operating a vehicle based upon the alcohol concentration of blood or breath) with I.C. § 9-30-5-2 (criminalizing operating a vehicle “while intoxicated”). Indeed, under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-1(a)—in contrast to Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-2(a)—the question is not whether a person was physically or mentally impaired by alcohol. Rather, to convict the defendant, the fact-finder must instead determine how much alcohol—down to hundredths of a gram—was in 100 milliliters of a person’s blood when that person operated a vehicle.
Only the laboratory report was relevant to this inquiry. Indeed, evidence of visible intoxication is not probative of a particular scientific measurement.
Ultimately, a fact-finder is entitled to make inferences, but those inferences must be reasonable. See Tin Thang v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1256, 1258-60 (Ind. 2014). Here, the State presented evidence that Artigas displayed signs of intoxication when he was pulled over around 3:00 a.m., and that his blood alcohol concentration was somewhere from .07 to .084 g/100mL at 3:53 a.m. From this evidence, a fact-finder could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Artigas’s blood alcohol concentration was at least .08 g/100mL when he operated the vehicle. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction as charged under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-1(a).
Reversed.
Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.