Vaidik, CJ.
Trevor Wert appeals his sixty-five-year murder sentence for beating to death a two-year-old child in his care. We affirm Wert’s sentence but remand for the trial court to correct an error in its written sentencing order.
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On November 5, the State charged Wert with murder and Level 1 felony child molesting. Exactly one month later, Wert and the State entered into a plea agreement. According to the agreement, Wert would plead guilty to murder, and the State would dismiss the child-molesting charge. Wert’s sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court as follows:
Upon the Defendant’s plea . . . to [murder], the parties shall be free to argue to the Court as to the appropriate sentence deemed appropriate [sic], subject to the following:
The parties agree that the sentencing range must, by law, be between 45 and 65 years, and that no portion of the sentence less than 45 years may be suspended. The State agrees that neither the death penalty nor life without parole shall be imposed. Any other terms of the sentence, including any special terms and conditions of probation (if probation is Ordered), restitution, fines, and Court costs, shall be to the Court’s discretion.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 30-31; see also Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a) (“A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.”).
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In pronouncing sentence, the trial court first explained that Wert’s sentence could be “anywhere from 45 to 65 years. The advisory sentence being 55 years.” …
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… The court then concluded:
[Defense counsel] mentioned that given your medical condition that whether [the sentence is] 45 years o[r] 65 years [it is] undoubtedly or highly likely that any sentence the Court imposes will be basically . . . life in prison for the rest of your life. So, at this point balancing the mitigating circumstances with the aggravating circumstances . . . I think that the aggravating circumstances . . . highly outweigh any mitigating circumstances the Court can find.
The court sentenced Wert to the maximum term of sixty-five years.
The court later issued a written sentencing order, which provides in pertinent part:
The reason for the imposition of this sentence is that it is the one called for in the plea agreement by the Prosecuting Attorney and the Defendant and which the Court has accepted. The Court is, therefore, bound to impose it.
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Wert first contends that the trial court’s written sentencing order misinterpreted the terms of his plea agreement. … Accordingly, he argues that his sentence “should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing.”
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In reviewing a sentencing decision in a non-capital case, we are not limited to the written sentencing statement but may consider the trial court’s comments in the transcript of the sentencing proceedings. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ind. 2002). Here, Wert’s plea agreement provides that the trial court had the discretion to impose a sentence between forty-five and sixty-five years, the statutory sentencing range for murder. See I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a). The trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing reflect that the court understood that it had discretion to sentence Wert within this range. First, both defense counsel and the State argued at sentencing that the trial court had the discretion to impose a sentence between forty-five and sixty-five years. Second, the trial court explicitly acknowledged this range before addressing the factors that it was considering. (“In . . . determining what the appropriate sentence should be in this case, [the court] obviously is constrained by the law. The law provides that for a conviction for murder the sentence is anywhere from 45 to 65 years. The advisory sentence being 55 years.” (emphasis added)). Third, the trial court identified aggravators and mitigators and then balanced them. Finally, right before imposing sentence, the trial court again recognized the sentencing range when it said that whether Wert’s sentence was forty-five or sixty-five years, it would be a life sentence for him. Id. at 46. In light of the trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the trial court did not misinterpret the terms of Wert’s plea agreement but rather made a mistake in its written sentencing order. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a new written sentencing order.
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Affirmed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.