Kirsch, J.
Randy L. Thornton (“Thornton”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Matthew Pietrzak (“Pietrzak”), Stephanie Buttz (“Buttz”) (together, “Appellees”), Eric Lee (“Lee”), and Dianna Johnson (“Johnson”), who are all probation officers. [Footnote omitted.] Thornton raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees because they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
We affirm.
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It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing H.B. v. State of Ind.- Elkhart Div. of Family & Children, 713 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied). The underlying purpose of the immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process. Id.
The same policy justifies granting immunity to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-judicial functions. Id. “This quasi-judicial immunity is given to people ‘performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.’” Id. (quoting H.B., 713 N.E. 2d at 302). Courts, however, are reluctant to apply quasi-judicial immunity too broadly. “[I]f the ‘acts do not involve the judicial process so that a fear exists that freedom of judicial decision-making may be stifled,’ then the person or act in question should not be shielded by immunity.” Id. (quoting Lake Cty. Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied)
In determining whether a person is entitled to the benefit of judicial immunity, we use the functional approach established by the United States Supreme Court and look to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the person who performed it. Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)). The act of executing or enforcing a court order is a function integral to judicial proceedings. Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Newman v. Deiter, 702 N.E.2d 1093, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999)), trans. denied. Thus, a nonjudicial officer who acts in furtherance of a valid court order is entitled to judicial immunity. Id. at 1226-27.
The question here is whether Appellees’ actions were so integral to or intertwined with the judicial process that, in performing them, Appellees would be considered an arm of the court and, therefore, immune. Appellees are probation officers who “serve at the pleasure of the appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the court.” Ind. Code § 11- 13-1-1(c). Pursuant to statute, probation officers have mandatory duties, including, to “notify the court when a violation of a condition of probation occurs” and to “keep accurate records of cases investigated by [them] and of all cases assigned to [them] by the court and make these records available to the court upon request.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-3(7), (9).
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Thornton asserts that, because the sentencing court vacated his probation violation, Appellees were not acting in furtherance of a valid court order when they filed the probation violation in August 2010. However, the sentencing court, in vacating the probation violation, did not find that Appellees acted in violation of the original sentencing order or that they exceeded their statutory authority in filing the notice of probation violation. The sentencing court, instead, found that it was unclear whether Thornton’s probation was tolled when he served his sentence in Cause 28198 and that there was no caselaw on the issue. Because of this ambiguity, Appellees did not knowingly file a false probation violation and keep inaccurate records regarding the status of Thornton’s probation. To the contrary, they followed their statutory duty to notify the court when a violation of a condition of probation occurred pursuant to the original sentencing order in Cause 81612 and their belief that Thornton was still on probation at the time he committed new offenses because his probation had been tolled when he served an executed sentence in an unrelated case. After Appellees filed the notice of probation violation, an evidentiary hearing was held, at which, Thornton argued that his August 2010 arrest did not violate the terms of his probation because his probation had ended in August 2009. Id. at 67. The sentencing court rejected that argument and found that Thornton had violated his probation. Id. at 28, 67. Based on this, we conclude that, in filing the notice of probation violation, Appellees were “performing [a task] so integral or intertwined with the judicial process” that they should be “considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” See D.L., 978 N.E.2d at 433. Appellees are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in their favor.
Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur