Crone, J.
Jeffery Thompson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to credit his sentence with 240 days that he served on pretrial home detention. The State does not oppose the motion. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying Thompson’s motion and therefore reverse and remand with instructions to credit that time to Thompson’s sentence.
In April 2016, the State charged Thompson with one count of level 6 felony operating while intoxicated endangering another person and one count of level 6 felony operating while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .15 or more. On June 26, 2018, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Thompson agreed to plead guilty to the first charge. The State agreed to dismiss the second charge and all the charges that Thompson had pending in cause number 49G15-1512-F6-45853 and cause number 49G15-1701-F6-3764
(“Cause 3764”). In Cause 3764, Thompson had been ordered to serve pretrial home detention from January 31, 2017, through September 28, 2017, a total of 240 days. He completed the home detention with no violations. Thompson and the State agreed to a total sentence of 730 days and also agreed that the credit time earned in Cause 3764 would be applied to that sentence.
The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Thompson to 730 days, with ten days executed and the rest suspended to probation. The court awarded Thompson sixty days of good time credit for his pretrial home detention in Cause 3764. …Thompson requested additional credit for the 240 days that he actually served on home detention. The State did not object to this request, and the trial court took it under advisement. On June 27, 2018, Thompson filed a motion to apply the 240 days against his sentence, which the trial court summarily denied.
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“To say that the case law has been murky on the issue of credit time for home detainees would be an understatement.” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (2014). Home detention may be imposed before trial, as a post-conviction placement in a community corrections program, or as part of probation. In Capes v. State, 634 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1994), our supreme court considered whether the defendant was entitled to credit for time served in pretrial home detention. … The court answered both questions in the affirmative, noting that the legislature had specifically provided credit for time served to postconviction home detainees in community corrections programs and that there was “no good reason” to treat pretrial home detainees differently. …
Three years later, the court was confronted with the same issue in Franklin v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1062 (Ind. 1997). This time, however, the court reached a different result based on the legislature’s post-Capes amendment to Section 35-38-2.6-6, which stated, “A person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC 35-50-6 unless the person is placed in the person’s home.” (Emphasis added.) The Franklin court concluded “that the amendment to the post-conviction home detention statute evinces legislative intent that credit time [i.e., credit for time served] can no longer be awarded to pretrial home detainees.” …
Just two years later, in Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. 1999), the court determined that the “credit time” mentioned in Section 35-38-2.6-6 was actually “good time credit” (i.e., the “additional credit a prisoner receives for good behavior and educational attainment”) and not credit for time served, id. at 222, and therefore overruled Franklin to the extent it held that the statute “prohibits an offender sentenced to home detention under a community corrections program from earning credit for time served[.]” Id. at 224.
Many legislative changes have been made in the nearly two decades since Purcell. For example, the legislature has specifically defined the various types of “credit” available to imprisoned or confined persons. …
The legislature has also revamped the statutes governing credit time classes. …
In addition, the legislature has amended Section 35-38-2.6-6 … the statute allows post-conviction home detainees in community corrections programs to earn both accrued time (calculated at a day for a day) and good time credit.
And finally, Section 35-50-6-3.1 now provides,
(a) This section applies to a person who commits an offense after June 30, 2014.
(b) A person assigned to Class A earns one (1) day of good time credit for each day the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
(c) A person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time credit for every three (3) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
(d) A person assigned to Class C earns one (1) day of good time credit for every six (6) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
(e) A person assigned to Class D earns no good time credit.
(f) A person assigned to Class P earns one (1) day of good time credit for every four (4) days the person serves on pretrial home detention awaiting trial.
Thompson correctly observes that, “[d]espite the statute’s silence, every other credit time classification listed in [Section 35-50-6-3.1] earns accrued time in addition to good time credit.” … He argues that “[i]t was unnecessary for the legislature to specifically state that a person in Class P receives accrued time because like those in the other credit time classes, it is implied.” He also argues that “[i]f the legislature intended to treat those on pretrial home detention and those incarcerated awaiting trial differently for purposes of accrued time, it would have so specified.” We agree on both counts. …
Thompson further observes that he “was unable to find any situation in the Indiana Code where a defendant can earn ‘good time credit’ without also earning accrued time.” We were also unable to find any such situation, which leads us to conclude that the legislature could not have intended such an absurd result. … Finally, we point out that there is no indication that the legislature intended to treat pretrial and post-conviction home detainees differently under the current statutory scheme.
Based on the numerous substantive legislative changes regarding credit time that have been enacted since Purcell, we conclude that Purcell is no longer good law with respect to accrued time for pretrial home detention. … We hold that a person placed on pretrial home detention earns accrued time (calculated at a day for a day) pursuant to the unmistakable implications of Section 35-50-6-3.1 and that the trial court has no discretion to deny it. …
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Thompson’s motion and remand with instructions to apply the 240 days of accrued time to his sentence.
Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.