Barteau, Senior J.
Chad E. Adams appeals from his four-year aggregate sentence after pleading guilty to one count of Level 5 felony carrying a handgun with a prior felony, contending that the trial court improperly calculated his accrued time and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand with instructions.
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Adams was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm with a prior felony as a Level 5 felony along with other charges. Adams entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to the Level 5 felony in exchange for dismissal of the other counts. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Adams to an aggregate term of four years with one and a half years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, one and a half years executed on community corrections, and one year of supervised probation. …
Adams challenges the trial court’s failure to recognize the time Adams spent in jail prior to sentencing. Adams was arrested and imprisoned in the county jail on June 17, 2017 and was confined, according to his statement made during a colloquy with the trial court at the sentencing hearing, for approximately six to eight hours before he was able to post bond. His pre-sentence investigation report credits him with one actual jail day from June 17, 2017 to June 17, 2017.
Despite the recommendation in the pre-sentence investigation report and Adams’ statement of the time he was confined prior to bonding out, the trial court refused to recognize one day of actual jail time because Adams had not been in jail for “twenty-four hours,” which the court noted was its view of the law until notified of caselaw to the contrary. …
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Because Adams was imprisoned prior to trial on an allegation that he committed a Level 5 felony, he was assigned to Class B for the calculation of accrued and credit time. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4 (2016). Indiana Code section 35-50-6-0.5(1) (2015) defines accrued time as “the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined.” Credit time is defined as “the sum of a person’s accrued time, good time credit, and educational credit.” Ind. Code § 35-50-60.5(2) (2015).
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In this case, however, the governing statute refers to the amount of “time” that a person is imprisoned or confined. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-0.5. Hence, there is no reference to days, as argued by Adams, or hours, as argued by the State. Further, the term “time” is not defined elsewhere in Title 35, Article 50. As such, we deem the statutory reference to time to be ambiguous.
“Under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, a statute is ambiguous when it allows more than one reasonable interpretation.” Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016). Adams and the State have vigorously argued in favor of their opposing interpretations of the statute. If a statute is deemed ambiguous, then courts on review resort to the rules of statutory interpretation to fulfill the legislature’s intent. “In criminal cases, this includes the rule of lenity–interpreting the statute in the defendant’s favor as far as the language can reasonably support.” Id.
Here, Adams’ liberty was deprived, by his undisputed account, for between six and eight hours. The trial court did not recognize Adams’ loss of liberty for that time. Further, we can only imagine the burden placed upon the Department of Correction if required to “clock in” a defendant upon his or her arrest and then “clock out” that defendant upon the posting of bond for purposes of determining the “time” spent in pre-sentence incarceration to be recognized later against any sentence imposed. We conclude that the rule of lenity informs us to implement the intent of the legislature by reversing the decision of the trial court and remanding the matter to the trial court for the issuance of an order awarding Adams with one day of accrued time.
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Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.