Tavitas, J.
The State appeals the trial court’s entry of declaratory judgment, declaring that the unlawful-entry statute, Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-14(b) (“the Statute”), is an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to Douglas Kirby. We reverse and remand.
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The underlying facts, as described by our Supreme Court, are as follows:
Douglas Kirby pleaded guilty to child solicitation in 2010, leading to a ten-year sex-offender registration requirement and an eighteen-month sentence, suspended to probation. His probation conditions made schools off-limits, but he asked for and received an exception for his son’s activities. He kept attending his son’s school events after finishing probation in 2012.
In 2015, though, Indiana Code section 35-42-4-14 made it a Level 6 felony for a “serious sex offender” to knowingly or intentionally enter school property. Under that new statute, a serious sex offender is someone who must register as a sex offender and has been convicted of a qualifying offense. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-14(a) (Supp. 2015). Child solicitation is one of those qualifying offenses, I.C. § 35-42-4-14(a)(2)(F), so Kirby had to stop attending school events.
Kirby challenged this restriction by seeking post-conviction relief. He argued that he did not “knowingly” plead guilty because he didn’t know at the time of his plea that he would later be barred from school property. He also alleged that the new statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it added punishment to an already-committed crime. The post-conviction court denied relief.
On appeal, Kirby challenged the school-entry restriction on three constitutional grounds—including the ex post facto claim. The Court of Appeals agreed with Kirby on that claim, holding that the statute’s school-entry restriction is unconstitutional as applied to him. Kirby v. State, 83 N.E.3d 1237, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
The State sought rehearing, arguing that post-conviction proceedings are the wrong vehicle for Kirby’s ex post facto claim. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing, and the State sought transfer—which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Kirby v. State, 95 N.E.3d 518, 519-20 (Ind. 2018). Our Supreme Court found that, while Kirby could not raise his ex post facto claim in a post-conviction proceeding, “he may have a vehicle for his claim” through a declaratory judgment action. Id. at 521. Our Supreme Court’s opinion vacated this court’s opinion on Kirby’s post-conviction proceeding.
On May 15, 2018, Kirby filed his declaratory judgment action. Kirby sought a judgment declaring that the Statute is an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to Kirby and “an Order specifically allowing [Kirby] to go on to school property for all lawful purposes[.] . . .” After a hearing, the trial court declared the Statute was unconstitutional as applied to Kirby and found the following:
10. The sentencing court allowed the petitioner to go onto school property to attend his son’s school functions and sporting events before the 2015 amendment.
11. The court finds that IC 35-[42]-4-14(b) is an ex-post [facto] law as it applies to the petitioner and is unconstitutional.
12. The petitioner may enter onto school property to attend his [son’s] school functions and sporting events.
Id. at 118.
Analysis
The ex post facto clause of the Indiana Constitution forbids laws that impose punishment for an act that was not otherwise punishable when it was committed. Ind. Const. art. 1 § 24; Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 2011). The aim of the ex post facto clause is to ensure that people are “give[n] fair warning of the conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties.” Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 809. The ex post facto clause also forbids laws (1) that impose punishment for an act that was not otherwise punishable when it was committed or (2) that impose additional punishment for an act then-proscribed.
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It is not excessive to prohibit Kirby from attending his son’s school events because of his prior criminal conviction. Presumably, being a registered sex offender is inconvenient, but it is not excessive to limit convicted sex offenders from regularly interacting with children. Kirby’s required sex offenderregistration—for a limited time—advances the Statute’s requirement to protect children from those who present a threat to them. See Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 813 … This factor weighs against finding the Statute to be punitive as applied to Kirby.
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For completeness, we emphasize that the exception to Kirby’s probation conditions entered by the trial court, which allowed Kirby to attend certain school activities in which his son and grandchildren participated, should not be a basis for finding that the Statute is unconstitutional as applied to Kirby. The exception applied to a condition of Kirby’s probation that he was prohibited from visiting all schools, playgrounds, and other locations unless his child or grandchildren were participating. Kirby’s probation and that probation exception ended in 2012, several years before the legislature enacted Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-14. Still, in his petition for declaratory judgment, Kirby uses the probation exception to emphasize why, in his view, the Statute was unconstitutional as it applied to him. Kirby’s petition for declaratory judgment states, “from the time of his sentencing in 2010 through the time that his sentence was reduced in early 2015, Kirby was allowed to go on to school property to participate in his son’s educational and extra[]curricular activities.”
The trial court agreed with Kirby that, because “[t]he sentencing court allowed the petitioner to go onto school property to attend his son’s school functions and sporting events before the 2015 amendment,” the Statute was unconstitutional as applied to Kirby. Because Kirby’s probation and probation exception ended in 2012, the probation exception was no longer in effect and, accordingly, is not determinative here. Moreover, the trial court’s order, declaring the Statute as unconstitutional as applied to Kirby, also seemingly still limits Kirby’s behaviors, stating only that the “petitioner may enter onto school property to attend his [son’s] school functions and sporting events.” Id. It seems odd that the trial court found the law unconstitutional as applied to Kirby, but still limited Kirby’s conduct to what was permitted by the trial court during probation. Nonetheless, we believe that the trial court’s implication that the probation exception was the driving force behind a finding of the Statute’s unconstitutionality as applied to Kirby was incorrect.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Kirby. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
May, J. concurs.
Baker, J., dissents with opinion.
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. After weighing the seven factors listed in Mendoza- Martinez, I would hold that the Statute is unconstitutional as applied to Kirby.