Bailey, J.
Case Summary
David Martin (“Martin”) filed a Notice of Claim in the Allen Superior Court Small Claims Division, alleging that he had sustained physical injuries in a vehicular collision with Jose Ramos (“Ramos”). The trial court found Ramos to be 100% at fault for the collision but denied Martin damages, concluding that Martin had not established causation. Martin filed a motion to correct error, which was denied, and he now appeals. We reverse and remand.
Issues
Martin presents two restated issues for review:
I. Whether expert medical testimony is unnecessary in small claims proceedings designed to administer justice expediently; and
II. Whether the trial court misapplied the law in determining that Martin had not established causation.
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Martin claims that “expert medical opinion is not necessary to prove causation of a subjective personal injury in a small claims action.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. He points out that small claims proceedings are intended to be informal, cost-effective, and expedient, even if complex issues are presented…
Martin correctly observes that small claims proceedings are to be informal. Indiana Small Claims Rule 8(A) provides: “The trial shall be informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law, and shall not be bound by the statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or evidence except provisions relating to privileged communications and offers of compromise.” Nonetheless, despite the informality of the proceedings, the parties in a small claims court bear the same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same issues. LTL Truck Service, 817 N.E.2d at 668. Although “the method of proof may be informal, the relaxation of evidentiary rules is not the equivalent of relaxation of the burden of proof.” Id. Thus, it remains incumbent upon the party who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the recovery sought. Id. The burden of proof with respect to damages is with the plaintiff. Id. (citing Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Martin’s public-policy arguments are unavailing; he was required to prove his negligence claim without deviation from the substantive law. We turn to consideration of whether the trial court properly applied the law when it determined that Martin failed to meet his burden.
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That said, the cases do not create a rule of law that expert medical testimony is always required in personal injury cases. If a layperson can readily understand the causation, an expert opinion is not necessary. “An essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the requirement of a reasonable connection between a defendant’s conduct and the damages which a plaintiff has suffered.” Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877. “When an injury is objective in nature, the plaintiff is competent to testify as to the injury and such testimony may be sufficient for the jury to render a verdict without expert medical testimony.” Id. But a “causal connection between a permanent condition, an injury, and a preexisting affliction or condition is a complicated medical question.” Topp, 838 N.E.2d at 1033 (citing Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877-78)). Expert testimony is needed then because a layperson is unable to understand causation in those circumstances. Id.
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Martin asserts that his medical records indicate an objective injury – a “left front post traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage.” Statement of the Evidence at 2. The hemorrhage noted in Martin’s medical records was “observable by the doctor” and discoverable independent of a patient report. See Topp, 838 N.E.2d at 1033. As such, Martin documented an objective injury. The salient inquiry was then whether the “occurrence was a cause in fact of his injury.” Smith v. Beaty, 639 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). In some circumstances, causation may be demonstrated without a medical expert stating an opinion to a degree of medical certainty. Id. at 1034.
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Absent a jury, a trial court acts both as gatekeeper of the evidence to be considered and the fact-finder. Martin testified that he experienced an increase in pain after the vehicular collision. But here in addressing the question of causation, the court foreclosed from its consideration evidence that was not expert medical testimony. Yet, as we observed in Daub, the “temporal congruity” between an event and experiencing pain is “admittedly some evidence of causation.” 629 N.E.2d at 878. It was therefore error for the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that Martin failed to present evidence on the issue of causation.
It is the plaintiff who determines the injuries for which he will seek compensation. And, it is true that the more complex the causal relationship is to the injury claimed, the greater the need for expert testimony on the issue presented in order for the plaintiff to meet his burden of proof. But Martin’s claim was not for complex or permanent injuries – he simply sought compensation for pain associated with the rear-end automobile accident.
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Martin testified and presented documentation regarding injury contemporaneous with the collision for which Ramos was at fault. The lack of complexity is such that a factfinder can determine issues of causation and damages without expert testimony. We remand for such determinations by the fact-finder.
Conclusion
Martin was required to prove his negligence claim without deviation from the substantive law. However, the trial court’s conclusion that Martin failed to establish causation as a matter of law is contrary to the evidence. We remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.