Opinion by Justice Goff
Zachariah Marshall challenges the propriety of his traffic stop for speeding under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. He presents us with an interesting question: When a police officer’s calibrated radar indicates an oncoming vehicle is speeding, the officer then verifies the radar speed exceeds the posted speed limit, but he ultimately fails to document the excessive speed, is there reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop? We answer yes and affirm the trial court.
During the early morning hours of October 29, 2016, as Reserve Officer Sean Dolan patrolled near State Road 8 and 500 West in Hebron, Indiana, in Porter County, he observed a vehicle approaching him through the darkness. … As the vehicle approached him, Officer Dolan heard the radar giving off a high-pitch tone. … Upon hearing the high pitch, Officer Dolan looked at the radar’s target speed, compared it to the 50-miles-per-hour speed limit sign posted just north of him, and saw the oncoming vehicle was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. …
One-hundred-percent sure the oncoming vehicle was speeding, Officer Dolan initiated a traffic stop, intending to cite the driver for speeding only. With the car stopped, Officer Dolan approached and found Zachariah Marshall was the driver. Explaining that he stopped Marshall for speeding, Dolan asked him for his driver’s license and vehicle registration. While Officer Dolan ran a warrant and BMV check, his backup officer (Corporal O’Dea) arrived at the scene and talked with Marshall. Corporal O’Dea smelled alcohol on Marshall and noticed his slowed and slurred speech. With the routine speeding traffic stop now turned into an OWI investigation, Officer Dolan exercised his discretion and decided not to cite Marshall for speeding, later explaining: “I knew he was going to have plenty of money problems and legal problems ahead of him that were going to be costly and I decided to cut him a break on the citation for speeding.” Since Officer Dolan did not issue Marshall a speeding ticket or a written warning, he did not document the speed he clocked Marshall driving.
The State of Indiana eventually charged Marshall with three counts: (1) A-Misdemeanor Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, Endangering a Person; (2) C-Misdemeanor Operating a Vehicle with an Alcohol Concentration Equivalent to at least 0.08 but less than 0.15; and (3) C-Misdemeanor Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated.
Marshall’s counsel deposed Officer Dolan on June 15, 2017, nearly eight months after the traffic stop. During that deposition, Officer Dolan could recall neither the posted speed limit near the intersection of Route 8 and 500 West where he pulled over Marshall nor could he remember the radar reading of how fast Marshall was driving that night. Officer Dolan, however, stated that at the time of the traffic stop, he could see the speed limit sign posted on 500 West.
On August 4, 2017, Marshall moved to suppress all evidence from the traffic stop, alleging he’d been illegally seized under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. …
The trial court eventually denied Marshall’s suppression motion. The court’s factual findings included that Officer Dolan “observed Defendant’s car speeding and . . . [he] was using a radar.” … The trial court certified the order for interlocutory appeal and Marshall appealed.
The Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction, and then reversed, holding: “Because Reserve Officer Dolan could not testify regarding the speed of Marshall’s vehicle in more specific terms . . . he did not have specific articulable facts to support his initiation of a traffic stop, and therefore the traffic stop violated Marshall’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Marshall v. State, 105 N.E.3d 218, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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Marshall argues that Reserve Officer Dolan lacked reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop since he did not document the radar speed, could not recall the posted speed limit in his deposition, and could not articulate Marshall’s precise speed at the deposition or the suppression hearing. We disagree because the reasonable-suspicion standard does not become more exacting for speeding violations.
Applying the reasonable-suspicion standard to traffic stops, we’ve previously said that, generally, “[a]n officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his on-the-spot evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred.” Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 870. While we abide by our prior statement, this case presents a variation on that jurisprudential theme by addressing what details must survive that on-the-spot evaluation for the traffic stop to hold up under the Fourth Amendment’s weight. Marshall presents a more specific question: when an officer stops a driver for speeding, does the reasonable-suspicion standard demand that the officer document the driver’s speed?
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… Marshall demands a number from Officer Dolan, reasoning that we cannot do a Fourth Amendment reasonable-suspicion analysis without one. In support of that argument, Marshall invites us to establish a bright-line rule requiring that officers document a driver’s exact speed in some way—by remembering it, documenting it in a citation, a written warning, or a probable-cause affidavit, or by recording the radar speed via a dashboard camera. …
First, we disagree with Marshall’s premise that the Fourth Amendment requires that an officer provide a number for how fast a defendant was driving. The reasonable-suspicion standard does not demand such measures. Like probable cause, reasonable suspicion is not readily quantifiable and cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Rather, the reasonable-suspicion “standard takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’” Prado Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 …
Second, we reject Marshall’s request for a bright-line rule for similar reasons and because we think such a rule unnecessary. As we just said, reasonable suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances of each particular case. …
Looking at the totality of these facts—the whole picture—Officer Dolan had reasonable suspicion to stop Marshall for speeding that night, meaning Dolan possessed and provided sufficient articulable facts or particularized, objective facts that Marshall was speeding. …
We, therefore, hold that the traffic stop did not amount to an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The Indiana Constitution’s Article 1, Section 11 also protects Hoosiers’ persons, property, and peace from unreasonable State intrusion. … Indeed, it is well settled that investigative stops, like traffic stops, receive protections under Article 1, Section 11. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1146. …
When a defendant challenges the propriety of an investigative stop under the Indiana Constitution, the burden falls to the State to “show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.’” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 368 (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205–06 (Ind. 2008)). …
First, based on the radar unit’s indications, Reserve Officer Dolan had a high degree of knowledge that Marshall was speeding. Officer Dolan testified his radar’s high-pitched tone alerted him that Marshall was speeding and even explained that a higher pitch indicated a faster speed. …
Second, we find that this initial seizure—a traffic stop for speeding— amounted to a small intrusion on Marshall’s ordinary activities. Officer Dolan stopped Marshall at approximately 2:40 a.m. on a road with little-to-no traffic. …
Third, we acknowledge that law enforcement has at least a legitimate, if not a compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws, including speeding limits. So long as governments set speed limits for public safety, those limits will need to be enforced.
Balancing these three factors, we hold Marshall’s traffic stop for speeding did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Officer Dolan possessed sufficient knowledge that Marshal was speeding, the initial stop was not intrusive, and law enforcement needs to be able to patrol speeding.
We hold this traffic stop passes muster under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. As it relates to the Fourth Amendment, we find there were sufficient articulable facts to give Reserve Officer Dolan reasonable suspicion that Marshall was speeding. And for Article 1, Section 11, we find the traffic stop was reasonable in view of the totality of the circumstances. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision denying Marshall’s motion to suppress evidence.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.