Bradford, J.
Case Summary
In August of 2015, John Weaver was driving a vehicle which he owned and which was insured by Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Indiana Farmers”) when he lost control and drove it into the home of Bryan and Sunday Vanzile (“the Vanziles”). Indiana Farmers sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to provide coverage to Weaver, who was driving with a suspended driver’s license, pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract (“the Policy”), specifically under the exclusions provision (“Entitlement Exclusion”). In 2018, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), joined by the Vanziles (collectively “Appellees”), moved for summary judgment, and Indiana Farmers moved for summary judgment as well. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Appellees and denied Indiana Farmers’s motion. Indiana Farmers contends that the trial court erred in denying its cross-motion for summary judgment because the Entitlement Exclusion excluded Weaver from coverage while driving with a suspended driver’s license. Because we disagree, we affirm.
While there is case law that has addressed entitlement exclusions in relation to a driver given permissive use of a vehicle from the policy holder, we have not yet had the opportunity to address entitlement exclusions in relation to the policy holder’s own use of a vehicle. We direct our focus to the basic principles of contract law to address this issue.
An insurance policy is a contract, and in reviewing the policy, we construe it as we would any other contract—to give effect to the parties’ intentions at the time the contract was made. The freedom to contract is a bedrock principle of Indiana law, and the freedom of the parties to exclude risks from an insurance contract is well established[.] Generally, insurers are free to limit liability in any manner not inconsistent with public policy, and an unambiguous exclusionary clause is ordinarily entitled to enforcement.
Founders Ins. Co. v. May, 44 N.E.3d 56, 61–62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted, brackets added), trans. denied. When the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carfield, 914 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Where an ambiguity exists, however, we construe a policy provision strictly against the insurer. Bradshaw v. Chandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. 2009). A provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one interpretation and reasonable persons would differ as to its meaning. Buckeye State, 914 N.E.2d at 218. “Strict construction against the insurer derives from the disparity in bargaining power characteristics of parties to insurance contracts.” Bradshaw, 916 N.E.2d at 166. We interpret policy terms from the perspective of the ordinary policyholder of average intelligence. Burkett v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 737 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Turning to the Policy, we conclude that the term “using” is ambiguous because its meaning is susceptible to differing interpretations by reasonable persons. Indiana Farmers contends that “using” should be interpreted as synonymous with “operating”; however, we conclude that the terms are not synonymous. While “operating” is one way of “using” a vehicle, it is not the only way. A person could use a vehicle for storage, to salvage spare parts from, or to display at a classic car show, none of which would require the person to operate the vehicle. Indiana Farmers could have drafted the Policy in a way that clearly defined “using” or included “operating”, just as insurance companies and the General Assembly have done. See Founders Ins. Co. v. Munoz, 930 N.E.2d 999, 1002 (Ill. 2010) (finding that the insurance policy excluded any person “operating an automobile without a reasonable belief that he or she is entitled to do so”) (emphasis added); see also Ind. Code § 27-1-13-7(b)(3) (statutorily mandating that insurance companies “insur[e] the owner against liability for damages…resulting from negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle…by any person legally using or operating the motor vehicle with permission, expressed or implied of the owner) (emphasis added). Moreover, reasonable minds may differ as to whether “using” one’s own vehicle under this exclusion is dictated upon one’s driver’s license status. Indiana Farmers could have drafted a provision that specifically excluded drivers from coverage who used the vehicle without a valid driver’s license. See Founders Ins. Co., 44 N.E.3d at 58 (noting that a policy provision specifically excluded a driver from coverage if he is “not a licensed driver, or is without a valid driver’s license, [or his] driver’s license is revoked or suspended”). Indiana Farmers’s failure to add further clarification leaves the term “using” ambiguous, and we must construe such ambiguities against the insurer. Therefore, Weaver had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use his vehicle pursuant to the language of the Policy.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., concurs.
Brown, J., concurs with opinion.
Brown, Judge, concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion that the term “using” is not synonymous with “operating” and would note that had Indiana Farmers wanted to dispel any uncertainty regarding the impact of an individual’s driver’s license status on coverage, it could have referred in certain provisions to “legally” using a vehicle; that is, Indiana Farmers could have drafted the Policy in a way that clearly defined and used “legally using.” Further, in light of the fact that the Policy leaves “entitled” undefined and uses elsewhere the phrase “legally entitled,” see, e.g., Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 106 (“We will pay compensatory damages which an ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover . . . .”), I find that reasonable persons could interpret subsection A(8) to refer to permission. For these reasons I concur with the majority opinion.