Bradford, J.
Case Summary [Footnote omitted.]
When Kathy Fillio left her Salem home in 2016 to spend some time in Florida, she left it and her animals under the care of her half-brother Dennis Slate. When a goat became ill, Slate called Darlene Perkins for help. As Perkins bent over to help the ill goat, a ram headbutted her, causing her to fall and break her arm or wrist. Perkins sued Fillio for negligence, both parties moved for summary judgment on the question of liability, and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Fillio. The trial court reasoned that Fillio had no way of knowing that Perkins would be on her property or that the ram had any dangerous propensities. Perkins argues that the trial court should have instead entered summary judgment in favor of her or, at the very least, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes the entry of summary judgment in favor of Fillio. Because we conclude that Perkins’s designated evidence does indeed generate a genuine issue of material fact as to Fillio’s potential liability, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Pursuant to Forrest and Ross, then, a duty to protect against harm caused by domestic animals can be established by one (or both) of the following: (1) a defendant’s knowledge that a particular animal has a propensity for violence or (2) a defendant’s ownership of a member of a class of animals that are known to have dangerous propensities, as the owner of such an animal is bound to knowledge of that potential danger. See Forrest, 570 N.E.2d at 935.
Fillio’s argument is that the owner of a domestic animal that causes injury cannot be held liable in the absence of specific knowledge that the animal in question has exhibited dangerous tendencies. As we have seen, however, a lack of that specific knowledge does not necessarily relieve a domestic animal owner of liability. Fillio relies on language indicating that “‘[o]wners of domestic animals may […] be held liable for harm caused by their pet but only if the owner knows or has reason to know that the animal has dangerous propensities.’” Gruber v. YMCA of Greater Indpls., 34 N.E.3d 264, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Poznanski ex rel. Poznanski v. Horvath, 788 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ind. 2003) (emphasis supplied by Gruber court removed)). This language, originally from the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Poznanski, does not exclude binding an animal owner with knowledge that her animal belongs to a class of animals known to have dangerous propensities. The Court’s pronouncement specifically includes those owners who know or have reason to know that their domestic animal has dangerous propensities, which would include those without specific knowledge about a particular animal. Indeed, in the very case on which Fillio relies, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the owner of a pig which had bitten a person only because (1) “the evidence designated at summary judgment show[ed] that […] the pig had never injured anyone or exhibited any dangerous propensities, including on the day in question” and (2) “the plaintiffs designated no evidence that the particular breed to which the pig belonged has dangerous propensities.” Gruber, 34 N.E.3d at 267–68 (emphasis added).
Here, while Perkins did not designate any evidence that the ram had ever exhibited any dangerous tendencies of which Fillio was aware, she did designate evidence that rams, as a class, do have dangerous tendencies, at least under certain circumstances. Specifically, Perkins designated Dr. Allen’s affidavit, in which he averred that rams are generally territorial and tend to defend themselves, their territory, and females perceived to be in their herd by headbutting unfamiliar animals or persons. This evidence generates a genuine issue of material fact as to the dangerous tendencies of rams, which, if true, Fillio is bound to have known. This would in turn generate a genuine issue as to whether Fillio took reasonable precautions under the circumstances to prevent the ram from causing injury to invitees on her land. We conclude that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Fillio on Perkins’s premises-liability claim.
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Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Fillio on Perkins’s premises liability claim. Perkins designated evidence that rams have dangerous tendencies as a class of animals, knowledge with which Fillio would be charged pursuant to Indiana law, if true. There is, therefore, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether rams are dangerous as a class of animals and, if so, a genuine issue as to whether Fillio took reasonable measures to prevent the ram from causing harm to invitees like Perkins. Perkins, however, did not designate evidence sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to negligent entrustment or negligent supervision. Finally, Perkins did not preserve her claim of vicarious liability for appellate review, a claim that is not supported by any designated evidence of underlying negligence in any event.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.