Baker, J.
Christopher Lee left a handgun in plain sight in his unlocked, unattended truck, which was parked in a public area. A minor, C.O., saw the gun, took it, and showed it to his friend, Matthew Kendall, resulting in the discharge of the weapon and the death of Kendall. Kendall’s mother, Shelley Nicholson, sued Lee for negligence. The trial court granted Lee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding as a matter of law that Indiana Code section 34-30-20-1 immunizes him from liability under these circumstances. Nicholson appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Finding no error, we affirm.
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The statute at issue in this case is Indiana Code section 34-30-20-1, which provides as follows:
A person is immune from civil liability based on an act or omission related to the use of a firearm or ammunition for a firearm by another person if the other person directly or indirectly obtained the firearm or ammunition for a firearm through the commission of the following:
(1) Burglary (IC 35-43-2-1).
(2) Robbery (IC 35-42-5-1). (3) Theft (IC 35-43-4-2).
(4) Receiving stolen property (IC 35-43-4-2) (before its amendment on July 1, 2018).
(5) Criminal conversion (IC 35-43-4-3).
For the purposes of our review, we will accept the following alleged facts as true: Lee owned a handgun and left it, loaded, in plain view in a public area in his unlocked, unattended truck; C.O. took the handgun from Lee’s vehicle without permission to do so, thereby committing one of the above listed offenses; C.O. showed the handgun to Kendall; and in the process, the handgun discharged, shooting and killing Kendall. See KS&E Sports, 72 N.E.3d at 898 (explaining that when reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we must accept as true the material facts alleged in the complaint).
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The Estate of Heck decision was published in April 2003, with rehearing denied in July 2003. The very next legislative session, beginning in January 2004, was when our General Assembly considered and enacted Indiana Code section 34- 30-20-1. The statute’s effective date was March 17, 2004—less than one year after Heck. We can only conclude, given this timeline, that the legislature enacted this statute in direct response to Estate of Heck.
When viewed through this lens, it becomes apparent that the General Assembly intended to shield gun owners from liability for failing to safely store and keep guns, when the gun that was unsafely stored is procured by a crime and then later used to commit another crime. And notwithstanding Nicholson’s creative argument, the text of the statute likewise supports this conclusion. A gun owner is immune from liability “based on an act or omission related to the use of a firearm” by another person if the firearm was procured by a crime. I.C. § 34- 30-20-1 (emphasis added). It cannot seriously be questioned that Lee’s failure to safely store his gun is “related to” C.O.’s later use of that same gun. In other words, the statute immunizes Lee from liability both for the acts of C.O. and for his own failure to properly store the gun.
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In sum, we find that both the plain language of Indiana Code section 34-30-20-1 as well as the fact that it was clearly enacted in response to our Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of Heck support the trial court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings to Lee. As a matter of law, he is immunized from liability in this case, whether the focus is on C.O.’s actions or Lee’s own failure to store his gun safely and properly.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.