May, J.
Joshua J. Kelp appeals following his convictions of Level 4 felony child exploitation, Level 5 felony child exploitation, and Level 5 felony possession of child pornography. Kelp argues:
(1) the trial court abused its discretion by considering a material element of his crime as an aggravator;
(2) his ten-year sentence is inappropriate; and
(3) the language in Special Probation Condition 12 is overly broad and vague.
We affirm in part and remand in part with instructions.
….
Kelp’s final argument is that Special Probation Condition 12 is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. “The trial court’s broad discretion in determining the conditions of probation is limited only by the principle that the conditions must be reasonably related to the treatment of the defendant and protection of public safety.” Stott v. State, 822 N.E.2d 176, 179-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Special Probation Rule 12 states:
You shall not possess obscene matter as defined by IC 35-49-2-1 or child pornography as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8), including but not limited to: videos, magazines, books, DVD’s, and material downloaded from the Internet. You shall not visit strip clubs, adult bookstores, motels, specifically operated for sexual encounters, peep shows, bars where partially nude or exotic dancers perform, or businesses that sell sexual devices or aids.
In Collins v. State, we held that prohibiting someone from visiting “businesses that sell sexual devices or aids” was unfairly broad as it “could extend to drug stores.” 911 N.E.2d 700, 714-715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The probation condition at issue herein is identical to the one at issue in Collins. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for clarification of the final clause of Special Probation Condition 12. See Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907, 921 (Ind. 2014) (Indiana Supreme Court agreed with the rationale in Collins regarding the overly broad probation condition).
The trial court committed harmless error when it improperly considered Kelp trading images as an aggravating factor. Also, in light of the nature of Kelp’s offenses and Kelp’s character, his ten-year sentence is not inappropriate. However, because Special Probation Rule 12 is overly broad, we remand to the trial court for clarification.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part with instructions.
Baker, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.