Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue
German Linares suffered injuries when a mobile food truck serving food in the parking lot of an automobile salvage business exploded while he waited in line for his food. Linares sued both the food truck operator, El Tacarajo, LLC, and the salvage business, U-Pull-and-Pay, LLC doing business as Pic-A-Part (“UPAP”), for negligence. Linares appeals the entry of summary judgment for UPAP, raising one issue for our review: whether summary judgment was inappropriate because UPAP owed Linares a duty regarding dangerous activities on its property or, in the alternative, because UPAP was engaged in a joint venture with El Tacarajo and is vicariously liable for its negligent acts. Concluding UPAP did not owe Linares a duty and was not engaged in a joint venture with El Tacarajo, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to UPAP.
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Linares contends that UPAP had a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that El Tacarajo’s food truck operation did not harm Linares while he was on UPAP’s property. He claims that given the nature of UPAP’s business, a gas explosion of any sort on UPAP’s property was foreseeable and therefore, UPAP had a duty to take “reasonable precautionary steps to inspect El Tacarajo’s operations[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
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The parties agree that Linares was an invitee on UPAP’s property. The parties also agree that UPAP therefore owed Linares the duty to exercise reasonable care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn him of known dangers or dangers that should have been known to UPAP. The parties disagree on the appropriate test to be applied in determining whether UPAP had a duty to protect Linares from the food truck explosion.
Linares first asserts his claim should be evaluated under section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and a committee comment thereto, arguing that he was “injured due to a dangerous appliance and the hazardous use of explosive materials[,]” and if UPAP had taken “reasonable precautionary steps to inspect El Tacarajo’s operations, it could have foreseen and prevented the explosion[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 11-12. [Footnote omitted.] Linares concludes UPAP, by the exercise of reasonable care, would have discovered the dangerous condition of the food truck and should have realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Linares and other business invitees.
We disagree with Linares that UPAP’s duty should be determined under the standard section 343 analysis for injuries resulting from a condition of the land. Although Linares is correct that when an injury occurs as a result of some condition on the land, section 343 describes the landowner-invitee duty and a foreseeability analysis is not required, Linares was not injured by a condition of UPAP’s land…
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Despite claiming his injuries were caused by a condition of the land, and despite further claiming that the foreseeability analysis should not apply because this case does not involve a criminal or intentional act, Linares does address the foreseeability analysis. He advocates that in this case, the test requires considering whether “a gasoline explosion or fire on UPAP’s property that could harm its customers” was foreseeable and concludes that it was. Appellant’s Br. at 15. In support of his argument, Linares notes that flammable materials regularly come onto UPAP’s property; that its employees are trained in safety hazards connected with collecting, storing, and handling those materials; and that it takes steps to prevent customers from using ignition sources in the yard; therefore, UPAP was at least theoretically aware of the hazards associated with flammable materials. [Footnote omitted.] Linares’s reliance on UPAP’s policies and procedures related to its own business are irrelevant for purposes of this analysis because it was not the activities surrounding UPAP’s business that caused Linares’s injuries. In other words, Linares was not injured by an explosion of flammable materials that belonged to or were the responsibility of UPAP. For this reason, we also disagree with Linares that the “broad type of harm” is any explosion on UPAP’s premises.
Although the foreseeability analysis for determining duty is a consideration of the broad “zone of danger” that could be caused by activities on the land (as opposed to the more specific “zone of danger” addressed by proximate cause), we do not conduct the analysis in the broadest terms possible. For instance, in Goodwin, the court identified the broad type of harm as “the probability of a criminal attack, namely: a shooting inside a bar.” 62 N.E.3d at 393. Thus, it is clear that we do not completely divorce this analysis from the circumstances; if we were to do so, the broad type of harm in Goodwin would have been described as simply the probability of an altercation between two bar patrons…
Accordingly, Linares’s formulation of the foreseeability analysis is too broad. True, UPAP was generally aware that flammable liquids and open flames can interact explosively and therefore had a duty to protect its invitees from explosions due to the materials that belonged to it. But for purposes of the foreseeability analysis, the type of plaintiff is a patron of a business and the broad type of harm is the probability or likelihood that an independently operated food truck on the premises of that business would explode or catch fire due to employee error.
No one—not UPAP, not El Tacarajo, and not Linares himself—believed or had any reason to believe the food truck was defective or dangerous…
Should food trucks be inspected? Probably. Should UPAP have taken more interest in a mobile business it allowed to operate on its premises and sell to its customers? Possibly. But should a company in a completely unrelated private business which periodically provides a parking space be required to conduct that inspection and ensure the food truck is safely maintained and its employees properly trained? Even if UPAP had asked the questions Linares and the dissent argue it should have, it still would not have been reasonably foreseeable to UPAP that the food truck would suddenly explode because of an employee’s negligence. [Footnote omitted.]
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Focusing on the harm inflicted on Linares when an employee of a food truck UPAP occasionally allowed onto its property—an employee whose job it was to operate a mobile food truck that relies on a generator to power its operations—fueled the generator in too close proximity to an open flame, we conclude that such harm was not normally to be expected and thus was not reasonably foreseeable by UPAP. Linares’ injury is unfortunate, but UPAP did not owe him a duty.
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Conclusion
Linares has failed to carry his burden to show us that the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of UPAP was improper.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., concurs.
Kirsch, J., dissents with opinion.
Kirsch, Judge, dissenting.
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Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases and, from my perspective, is not appropriate here. These cases are fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person. The determination of liability should be made by a jury after hearing all the evidence. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004).
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.