Altice, J.
On June 10, 2014, Pebble Stafford pled guilty to three offenses each under a separate cause number, and her plea agreement provided that she would receive consecutive sentences of six years executed, thirty days in jail, and four years executed with direct placement in community corrections. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Stafford accordingly. In 2017, Stafford petitioned the trial court for a sentence modification. Over the State’s objection, the trial court granted Stafford’s motion. The State appealed.
We issued an opinion in this case in October 2017 and determined that in light of the legislature’s 2014 amendment to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17, Stafford did not waive her right to sentence modification by entering into a fixed plea agreement, and thus, the trial court was authorized to modify her sentence without the approval of the prosecutor. We therefore affirmed the trial court’s modification of Stafford’s sentence, but asked the legislature for clarification.
Likely in response to our request, the legislature amended I.C. § 35-38-1-17 effective on July 1, 2018. Our Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated our original opinion in this case, and remanded to us with instructions to reconsider in light of this amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we now conclude that the trial court was not authorized to amend Stafford’s sentence as it was pursuant to a fixed plea agreement.
Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
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Through its amendment, the legislature made a definitive statement that trial courts are not authorized to modify sentences that were imposed by virtue of a plea agreement unless the agreement itself contemplated such a modification and/or the prosecuting attorney agrees to the modification. In other words, it is now clear that the sentencing parameters of a plea agreement continue to bind a trial court during subsequent modification proceedings. See I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e).
Just as inaction by the legislature can be viewed as acquiescence in a judicial interpretation of a statute, “the opposite is also true, i.e., that action by the legislature to amend a law can help clarify the legislature’s original intent in adopting the law.” In re J.S., 48 N.E.3d 356, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
When the legislature disagrees with judicial rulings, it can act swiftly to assert that a court’s interpretation of its statute is incorrect. Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Intern., 745 N.E.2d 755, 761 (Ind. 2001). …
Here, the legislature acted swiftly following the decisions in Stafford and Rodriguez. We can glean from this that the legislature was simply making clear its original intent, and thus, the 2018 amendment to I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e) and (l) did not change the original meaning of the statute. We therefore conclude that the legislature never intended to create a right to modification of fixed sentences imposed under a plea agreement. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not have authority to modify Stafford’s sentence without the prosecutor’s approval.
In light of the foregoing, we reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to reinstate Stafford’s sentence as provided in the plea agreement. In doing so, we observe that I.C. § 35-38-1-17(l) still reflects the overriding public policy against waiver-of-modification provisions. Nonetheless, the statutory framework limits the range of possible modification to that “authorized by the plea agreement.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e), -17(l)(1). In this case, Stafford entered into—and the trial court accepted—a plea agreement with just one authorized sentence, thereby leaving no room for modification. Notably, however, Indiana
trial courts retain broad discretion to accept or reject plea agreements. See I.C. § 35-35-3-3; Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994); Meadows v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1981). Thus, if ever desired, a trial court may avoid the instant issue by rejecting a “fixed sentence” plea agreement that fails to authorize sentence modification in the case of changed circumstances.
Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
Bailey, J., concurs.
Baker, J., dissents with opinion.
I respectfully dissent. In the legislative session that convened following our original decision in Stafford, our General Assembly reconsidered and amended the language included in the 2014 amendment of Indiana Code section 35-38-117. In my view, the General Assembly realized that this Court’s interpretation of the statute was both right and reasonable. For that reason, the legislature followed our suggestion to clarify the statute.
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