Crone, J.
Case Summary
Wanda Denson was severely injured when Delmer Dillard had a heart attack and lost consciousness while driving a vehicle in which Denson was a passenger. Dillard ran the vehicle off the road and struck a home. Dillard died. Denson filed a negligence claim against Dillard’s estate (“the Estate”) as well as an underinsured motorist claim against her automobile insurer, Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“the Insurance Company”). The Estate subsequently moved for summary judgment, claiming that Dillard’s sudden loss of consciousness or medical emergency negated the element of breach on Denson’s negligence claim. Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Estate. Denson appeals that ruling, claiming that the trial court erred. Under the narrow and specific circumstances presented here, we conclude that the designated evidence negates the element of breach, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Estate.
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The trial court here concluded that the Estate successfully negated the element of breach on Denson’s negligence claim. Although the question of breach is usually one for the trier of fact, Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. 2005), where the relevant facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion, the court as a matter of law may determine whether a breach of duty has occurred. King v. Ne. Sec., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 474, 484 (Ind. 2003). With respect to the element of breach, the parties and the amicus curiae put considerable effort into debating whether Indiana should formally recognize a “sudden medical emergency” or “sudden loss of consciousness” affirmative defense that has been adopted in several jurisdictions and provides that a sudden loss of consciousness while driving is a complete defense to an action based in negligence if such medical emergency or loss of consciousness was not foreseeable. [Footnote omitted.] See Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, 428 (Ohio 2003) (noting that at least thirty-six states, including Indiana, recognize such defense). [Footnote omitted.] We see no need to formally recognize a specific doctrine or defense and think that the application of general negligence principles adequately addresses the situation at hand.
When considering breach of the duty of care, we always begin with the “venerable legal concept of the ‘reasonable person.’” Key v. Hamilton, 963 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. It is well settled that to avoid being negligent, an actor must conform his conduct to that of a reasonable person under like circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). Section 283(C) of the Restatement explains that if “the actor is ill or otherwise physically disabled, the standard of conduct to which he [or she] must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable [person] under like disability.” In other words, a person under a temporary or permanent disability “may be required, under particular circumstances, to take more precautions than one who is not so disabled, while under other circumstances he may be required to take less.” Id., cmt. c. Thus, “an automobile driver who suddenly and quite unexpectedly suffers a heart attack does not become negligent when he loses control of his car and drives it in a manner which would otherwise be unreasonable; but one who knows that he is subject to such attacks may be negligent for driving at all.” Id.
Here, the Estate presented prima facie evidence that Dillard suddenly suffered a heart attack and lost consciousness before losing control of the car and crashing. [Footnote omitted.] Because we determine as a matter of law that Dillard cannot be found to have acted unreasonably after he suffered the attack and was rendered unconscious, the issue becomes whether Dillard acted unreasonably in deciding to drive in the first place. That is to say, the question is whether Dillard’s sudden physical incapacity was reasonably foreseeable such that a reasonably prudent person in his position would not have risked driving. We agree with the trial court that the Estate made a prima facie case on this issue and that the evidence designated by Denson fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.
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In sum, the Estate made a prima facie showing that Dillard’s sudden physical incapacity was not reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, under the narrow circumstances presented, the Estate met its burden as summary judgment movant to affirmatively negate the element of breach on Denson’s negligence claim. The burden then shifted to Denson to come forward with contrary evidence requiring resolution by a trier of fact. See Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The evidence designated by Denson is insufficient to create a genuine issue. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the Estate’s favor. [Footnote omitted.]
Affirmed. Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.