Crone, J.
Case Summary
Celene I. Bock (“Wife”) appeals the trial court’s division of property in proceedings dissolving her marriage to Dale F. Bock (“Husband”). She alleges that the trial court erred in including as a marital asset her survivor benefit from Husband’s pension. She also challenges the valuation of the survivor benefit as well as the trial court’s equal division of the marital estate. Finding that Wife’s survivor benefit was properly included and valued and that the trial court acted within its discretion in equally dividing the marital estate, we affirm.
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Wife essentially argues that her SBP must be excluded because it is subject to complete defeasance if she predeceases Husband and therefore is too speculative and remote to constitute marital property. She relies on the recent case of Harrison v. Harrison, in which another panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude from the marital estate a wife’s interest in her family trusts. 88 N.E.3d 232, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied (2018). The Harrison court emphasized that the wife’s interest was subject to a complete defeasance if she predeceased her parents and that even during her lifetime, she was not entitled to any disbursements and would receive a disbursement only upon a majority vote of the co-trustees. Id.
We find Harrison distinguishable. While Harrison’s discussion of remoteness and defeasance is instructive, the distinction between the family trusts in that case and the pension benefits in this case cannot be ignored. Our legislature and our courts have spoken directly and specifically where the asset at issue is a present or future interest in a pension plan. Indiana Code Section 31-9-2-98(b) includes the following within the definition of property to be included in the marital estate…As previously noted, it is undisputed that Husband’s pension rights vested during the marriage. In fact, Husband took monthly disbursements for ten years prior to the dissolution, and his election to provide a SBP benefit for Wife meant a decrease in his monthly disbursements. As of the date of initial disbursement, the SBP election became irrevocable. Nevertheless, in characterizing her interest as defeasible, remote, and speculative, Wife appears to argue that for her SBP interest to be deemed marital property, it too must be vested during the marriage, which would be impossible because it would vest only on Husband’s death.
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Both Carr and Leonard illustrate that present and future pension interests are properly includable in the marital estate despite the inherently uncertain nature of both parties’ interests. A pension holder who has vested but has not yet taken distributions would suffer a complete defeasance if he/she were to die and would not be entitled to any further benefits if he/she is already taking distributions. Similarly, the SBP designee receives benefits only if he/she outlives the pension holder and therefore would suffer a complete defeasance for predeceasing the pension holder. In other words, where pensions are involved, both parties’ interests are, to a certain extent, remote and speculative. At the same time, pension interests often represent a significant portion of the marital estate, particularly when the parties are older and one or both spouses have participated in the pension plan(s) for a significant length of time. Our legislature and our courts have recognized the uniqueness of pension interests and have determined that they are properly includable in the marital estate. The trial court did not clearly err in including Wife’s SBP interest in the marital estate.
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To the extent that Wife cites as unfair Husband’s receipt of the marital residence, a present enjoyment, in contrast to her SBP, a future defeasible interest, we will not revisit her argument that the SBP should not have been included in the marital estate. The trial court was unpersuaded by either party’s argument concerning property division and found, “Neither party has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that an equal division of the marital estate would not be fair and reasonable such that the statute should be rebutted.” Id. We agree, especially in light of the thirty-year duration of their marriage. The trial court acted within its discretion in ordering the equal division of the marital estate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur