Crone, J.
In our prior opinion in this case, Rodriguez v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. granted, we held that the trial court erred in ruling that Alberto Baiza Rodriguez had waived his right to seek modification of his fixed sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement in 2016 for crimes committed in 2015. We based our holding on a 2014 statutory amendment which unambiguously provides that “[a] person may not waive the right to sentence modification under this section as part of a plea agreement.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(l) (2014). Our supreme court granted transfer. The court did not hold that our interpretation of the statute was erroneous and affirm the trial court’s ruling; instead, the court remanded with instructions to reconsider our holding in light of the legislature’s 2018 amendments to Indiana Code Sections 35-38-117 and 35-35-1-2.
We invited the parties to submit supplemental materials, which they did. Rodriguez argues that the 2018 amendments are not intended to apply retroactively, and, even if they were, such an application would unconstitutionally impair his contractual rights under his plea agreement with the State. We agree with Rodriguez. Therefore, we reaffirm our original holding, reverse the trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion to modify his sentence, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
….
Rodriguez posits that “[t]he Supreme Court’s remand for reconsideration … seems to suggest that the General Assembly’s changes to the law may have some retroactive effect on this Court’s prior ruling[,]” and he correctly observes that, “[a]s a general rule, changes in law apply prospectively only unless the General Assembly expressly provided otherwise.” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 4, 5. See Diaz v. State, 753 N.E.2d 724, 728 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Generally, amendatory acts are given prospective effect only, unless retrospective application is expressly provided therein.”), trans. denied; see also Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 421 (Ind. 2000) (“Subsequent legislation does not serve retroactively to amend legislation or declare the intent of a prior General Assembly.”). Rodriguez further observes that “[e]ven when [amendments] are remedial, retroactive application is disfavored when existing rights would be infringed.” Id. (quoting Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied). He argues that applying the 2018 amendments to Sections 35-38-1-17 and 35-35-1-2 retroactively to plea agreements made between July 1, 2014, and July 1, 2018, “would infringe on a plea bargainer’s right to petition for a modification as it existed under the modification statute at the time.” “The challenger to the validity of a statute must overcome a presumption that the statute is constitutional. That party bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Johnson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 686, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted). We conclude that Rodriguez has met that burden here.
Plea agreements are contracts, and contract law principles provide guidance in considering the agreement. Fowler v. State, 977 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 981 N.E.2d 623 (2013), trans. denied. “Generally, unless a contract provides otherwise, all applicable law in force when the agreement is made impliedly forms a part of the agreement without any statement to that effect.” The applicable law in force when Rodriguez entered his plea agreement with the State included the 2014 amendments to Section 35-381-17, which we have held allow the modification of fixed sentences. “Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts.” …
….
… We find … and therefore hold that retroactive application of the 2018 amendments as to Rodriguez would violate the federal constitution’s Contract Clause.
On a more basic level, regardless of whether retroactive application of the 2018 amendments would substantially impair Rodriguez’s contractual rights under the plea agreement, it would be fundamentally unfair. … Based on the foregoing, we reaffirm our prior holding, reverse the trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion to modify his sentence, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Rucker, S.J., dissents with separate opinion.
Rucker, S.J., dissenting.
For the reasons expressed in my earlier dissenting opinion, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in the instant case. See Rodriguez v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1033, 1038-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).