Massa, J.
The proper venue for seeking specialized driving privileges depends on whether the petitioner’s underlying suspension was court ordered or whether it was imposed administratively by the BMV. The latter suspension type requires the petitioner to seek relief in his or her county of residence; the former requires the petitioner to file in each court that ordered a suspension.
But where is the proper venue for seeking relief when that person “forfeits” driving privileges for life following a felony conviction for driving while suspended? Because we consider this lifetime forfeiture an administrative suspension, we hold the proper venue is the trial court in a person’s county of residence. We thus affirm the trial court’s order granting Reinhart’s petition for specialized driving privileges.
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I. Sections 3 and 4 designate venue rather than confer jurisdiction.
We must first decide whether, under Indiana Code chapter 9-30-16, a trial court in one county has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an SDP petition when an underlying suspension resulted upon conviction by a trial court in another county.
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Here, the Adams Superior Court, as with all Superior Courts in Indiana, exercises “original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases.” See I.C. § 33-29-1-1.5. And the SDP Statute neither restricts a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction nor confers it exclusively to a particular court.4 The statute instead simply prescribes venue, “the location at which trial proceedings are to occur from among the courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction.” [Footnote omitted.] J.T.D., 21 N.E.3d at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Ind. Trial Rule 75(D) (“No statute or rule fixing the place of trial shall be deemed a requirement of jurisdiction.”). [Footnote omitted.]
This “special procedure” controls “the exercise of the judicial function.” State ex rel. Root v. Circuit Court of Allen Cty., 259 Ind. 500, 505–06, 289 N.E.2d 503, 507 (1972) (discussing the pleading and venue requirements under the former statute governing restricted driving permits). But procedural error doesn’t rob the court of jurisdiction. K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 541. See also Hammer, 92 N.E.3d at 652 (whether a suspended driver petitions the proper court under the SDP statute is a “question of legal error, not jurisdictional error”). Failure to transfer the SDP petition to the proper court under Trial Rule 75(B), upon timely objection, simply renders the court’s final judgment voidable and thus subject to appeal. In re Chapman, 466 N.E.2d 777, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied.
In concluding that the SDP Statute establishes venue requirements, we reject the State’s argument that the Adams Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to stay the lifetime license forfeiture imposed by the Noble Superior Court.
II. Absent a conviction modification, a lifetime license forfeiture under Section 16 is an administrative suspension.
Reinhart argues that a lifetime license forfeiture is an administrative suspension subject to Section 4. Upon his felony conviction, he insists, the forfeiture resulted by operation of law. The State counters that a lifetime forfeiture is a court-ordered suspension subject to Section 3 because “only a court may impose criminal punishment on someone convicted of a felony.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Without the court’s judgment of conviction, the State contends, the “BMV did not have the authority to suspend Reinhart’s license under Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16,” and “any attempt to allow the BMV to impose criminal punishment would violate the separation of powers doctrine.” Id. at 15–16; Resp. to Trans. at 12.
A. As a collateral consequence of conviction, the lifetime license forfeiture is an administrative suspension.
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B. A conviction modification under Section 16 results in a court-ordered suspension.
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In sum, we hold that, under Section 16, a conviction modification from a Level 6 felony to a Class A misdemeanor results in a court-ordered suspension. But with no conviction modification, a lifetime license forfeiture constitutes an administrative suspension for purposes of the SDP Statute. [Footnote omitted.]
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Conclusion
Today, an estimated 420,000 Hoosiers navigate their daily lives with suspended driving privileges. Ryan T. Schwier & Autumn James, Indiana University McKinney School of Law, Roadblock to Economic Independence: How Driver’s License Suspension Policies in Indiana Impede Self-Sufficiency, Burden State Government & Tax Public Resources 6 (2016), available at https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/practice/clinics/_docs/DL_Rpt_2-1-16.pdf. With few alternative forms of transportation, many of these individuals face significant barriers to maintaining employment and supporting their families, an outcome that effectively discourages economic independence. Id. at 35. To be sure, Indiana’s traffic laws play a critical role in keeping the roads safe for drivers in the state. And those who violate these laws must be held accountable. But when the legislature has offered an avenue of relief to those who can demonstrate hardship, and when a court determines that they no longer threaten public safety, we see no reason to impose additional roadblocks.
For the reasons specified above, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Reinhart’s petition for relief from all three suspensions under Indiana Code section 9-30-16-4.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.