David, J.
Defendant Kevin Andrew Schuler pled guilty to the murder of Asenath Arnold and to felony murder for the death of Gary Henderson at the hands of his accomplice Austin Scott. Schuler was sentenced to life without parole for the murder charge and received a consecutive sixty-five-year sentence for the felony murder. Schuler raises four issues in this appeal, arguing a violation of his Miranda rights, insufficient evidence to support his sentence, that his sentence was inappropriate, and failure of the trial court to meet certain requirements in its sentencing statement. We affirm the trial court on each of Schuler’s first three claims but remand this matter for a new sentencing statement.
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Schuler’s final argument is that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Harrison v. State and impermissibly considered nonstatutory aggravators when it sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. We review a trial court’s sentencing order for an abuse of discretion. Rice, 6 N.E.3d at 943 (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007)). An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court enters a sentencing statement explaining the reasons for imposing the given sentence, “but the record does not support the reasons or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.” Id.
When trial judges exercise discretion over the sentence imposed for the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, the court must comply with the requirements outlined in Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind. 1995). … Under Harrison, we require that sentencing findings in capital cases:
(i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found, (ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, (iii) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence, and (iv) must set forth the trial court’s personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime.
Harrison, 644 N.E.2d at 1262 (internal citations omitted). These requirements are in place to “insure [sic] the trial court consider[s] only proper matters when imposing [a] sentence…and to enable the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” Id.
The trial court in the present case verbally discussed its sentencing decision from the bench. Examining the trial court’s statements at sentencing, we can only make out the rough silhouettes of each Harrison factor, none of which come into clear focus.
As to the first and second Harrison factors, the trial court clearly identified the aggravating circumstance of an intentional killing during the commission of a robbery, but also referenced “other aggravating circumstances,” none of which are readily identifiable from the court’s statements. While the life without parole sentencing statute requires only one aggravating circumstance, see Ind. Code § 35-502-9(a), we have consistently held that, in the context of life imprisonment without parole, courts must, “limit the aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in the…statute.” Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 991-92 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 383 (Ind. 2000)). Without any clear indication of what “other aggravating circumstances” the court considered, we cannot ensure only proper matters were considered.
Similarly, it is not clear to us that the sentencing statement meets the third Harrison factor. Although the trial court found that the “aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances,” it is hard to assess how the court balanced the factors without specific identification of any mitigating factors. While courts are not required to find mitigating circumstances, see Clippinger, 54 N.E.3d at 992, the court here at least hinted at several factors it considered in determining Schuler’s sentence. Without specificity, it is difficult for us as an appellate court to review the imposition of the sentence.
As to the final Harrison factor, the court’s statements imply that it came to the personal conclusion that the sentence was appropriate. At the beginning of its statement, the trial court noted, “nothing I do here today is probably going to allow you to see [Schuler] outside of prison walls…I have to decide whether life in prison or a term of years is appropriate.” After discussing the various factors at issue in the case, the trial court concluded by “impos[ing] a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Asenath Arnold.” But without clear substance between these two statements, we cannot say with certainty that “[t]he court’s balancing of the evidence emphatically displays its discrete, individualized sentencing.” Azania v. State, 730 N.E.2d 646, 653 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 790 (Ind. 1997)).
For these reasons, we do not think the requirements of Harrison have been met. If a sentencing statement does not meet the requirements of the law, “we are unwilling to affirm [a] sentence of life without parole.” Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1129 (Ind. 2003). There are three options, then, that we must consider: “(1) remand the matter to the trial court for clarification or a new sentencing determination; (2) affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or (3) independently reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Id. As a practical matter, we have previously given trial courts the opportunity to revise a sentencing statement if it does not conform to the requirements of Harrison. See, e.g., Clippinger, 54 N.E.3d at 987, 991-92 (reweighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances after an initial remand for a clearer sentencing statement); Brown, 783 N.E.2d at 1129 (electing to independently evaluate aggravating and mitigating circumstances after already remanding for a revised sentencing order). We elect to follow the same course here. …
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that Schuler’s Miranda rights were not violated, there was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to prove the necessary aggravating factor of an intentional killing during the commission of a robbery, and that Schuler’s sentence is appropriate. We remand this matter, however, for a more specific sentencing statement consistent with Harrison.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.